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Korean automobile manufacturer Kia does not offer a Seoul Minivan, nor
has rival Hyundai commemorated its Alabama assembly plant with a
Montgomery Sedan. Triangulation based on model names would place the heart
of the Korean automobile industry somewhere in the deserts of the southwestern
United States, between Sedona (the name of Kia's minivan), Santa Fe (a
Hyundai SUV), and Tucson (another Hyundai). These model names reflect what
marketers have known for generations-the power of certain places to stir the
imagination of consumers, even when the association of product and place exists,
as in these instances, in name only.
For well over a century, trademark laws, and the courts interpreting them,
have treated geographic terms as a subject of special concern. t They have been
sympathetic to the desire of marketers to describe the physical origin of their
products, unhindered by the claims of a manufacturer who has adopted a
geographic term as its brand name.2 But sometimes they conclude that denying
exclusivity to a trademark rooted in geography could cause unacceptable harm
to the owners of the brand or to consumers. 3 Resolution of the conflict may
depend on such factors as whether the geographic allusion is obvious or
obscure,4 whether it is accurate or inaccurate, 5 whether consumers would be
moved by it to make a purchase, 6 and whether the geographic term has been
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. J.D., 1988, University of California,
Berkeley. I would like to thank the University of Alabama Law School Foundation and Dean Kenneth
Randall for their support of this research. Thanks also to Penny Gibson and Creighton Miller of the
University of Alabama Law School library for their assistance in locating sources.
1. See infra Part II for a detailed history of the law relating to geographic trademarks.
2. See infra notes 55-56, 59, 63-65, 68, and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 60, 62, 69, and accompanying text.
4. Marks that consumers do not recognize as referring to a place are not treated, under the
federal Lanham Act, as "primarily" geographically descriptive or geographically deceptively
misdescriptive. See infra text accompanying notes 132-37.
5. The Lanham Act refers separately to marks that are "primarily geographically descriptive"
and "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2), (3) (2000). The
consequences of description and misdescription may be significantly different. See infra Part II.B.
6. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit currently interprets the Lanham
Act, a mark may be denied registration as "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" only
if consumers would regard the misdescription as material to their purchasing decision. In re Cal.
Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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used as a brand name for so long, or with such impact, that consumers would
perceive the term primarily as a brand name rather than as a place name.
7
Although, in some respects the issues have changed little since 1872 when
the Supreme Court addressed the use of the term "Lackawanna" as a brand
name for coal,8 the treatment of geographic names under the trademark laws has
experienced unusual bouts of revision, uncertainty, and pendulum swings.9 One
thing that has remained relatively constant is an implicit assumption that the
message to consumers in a geographical trademark, if there is any message at all,
tends to be a literal one-these goods come from this place.10 That message may
be true, or it may be false. When no such message is conveyed because, in spite
of the name, consumers would not expect such goods to come from that place
(e.g., "Alaska bananas""), courts treat the geographic term as benignly
"arbitrary."12
That kind of analysis threatens to miss the point of a name like Kia
"Sedona." Of course, consumers who are familiar with Sedona would not expect
a vehicle to be manufactured there; the "new age" resort community in Arizona
is not known for its heavy industry. Nor does the name "Sedona" communicate,
even indirectly, something specific about the features of the minivan, such as a
powerful air conditioner for arid climates or a capacious gasoline tank for long
desert journeys. On the other hand, the name "Sedona" is not "arbitrary" in the
sense that it was selected at random. No doubt Kia chose it carefully. Kia
selected the name, probably, because for consumers familiar with the resort, the
name evokes ideas with which the Korean manufacturer would like to associate
its brand-leisure, extravagance, fashion, even spiritual fulfillment.
Geographic terms may convey, or may seem to convey, important concrete
information about the goods with which they are associated. An Oregon pinot
noir, if it is genuinely from Oregon, may taste different than a South African
pinot noir, due to differences in climate where the grapes are grown or
differences in the techniques used by vintners in the region. Yet, as production
becomes more globalized, mechanized, and standardized, such physical
differences become less common. In functional terms, it has never mattered less
whether a watch called "Swiss" was manufactured in Geneva or Taipei. The
7. The development of a secondary meaning may allow a mark to be registered when it otherwise
would have been denied registration as "primarily geographically descriptive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2),
(0.
8. See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 328 (1871) (holding that coal from the Lackawana region
could be sold as "Lackawana coal," even though the term had been associated with a particular brand
of coal).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (categorizing geographical indications as descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive).
11. Courts often provide "Alaska bananas" as an example of a trademark based on geographic
location that would suggest to no one a genuine connection between the place and the goods. E.g., In
re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
12. See infra Part II.B.2.
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significance of geographic terms, when attached to goods, is increasingly
symbolic.
Marketers today emphasize the importance of emotion or fantasy in selling
even ordinary goods, and geographic names are a potent source of ready-made
associations. When General Motors names a vehicle "Tahoe" or "Sierra," it has
already taken an important step in "positioning" the product in the symbolic
landscape where consumers shop. A Manhattan pickup might be physically
identical to the GMC Sierra, but its selling proposition would be significantly
different. In the realm of meaning, it would be a different truck-trading
ruggedness for sophistication. At least that is what marketers, and scholars who
study marketing, would maintain. 13 So as courts and lawmakers struggle with
geographic trademarks that may be taken literally, it is important also to
consider geographic trademarks that are conceived, and interpreted,
symbolically. Should the community of Sedona, for example, have some control
over the borrowing of if its evocative name? To whom does that symbolic luster
belong?
Part II of this Article surveys the treatment of geographic terms under the
trademark laws of the United States, particularly in those cases where the term
does not literally describe the place of origin of the associated product. Recent
decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have
made it more difficult to challenge the trademark status of such terms. Part III
examines contemporary theories of marketing and consumerism, which suggest
(1) that the symbolic or emotional aura imparted to goods through advertising
serves to distinguish successful products from their physically identical
competitors, and (2) that such symbolism adds genuine value to goods by
enhancing the experience of consumption and by contributing meaning to the
lives of consumers. Part IV discusses whether the symbolic value of geographic
trademarks, as applied to goods from other places, justifies policies that
encourage their adoption, or whether the use of such trademarks should be
curtailed, even if consumers are neither confused nor deceived. I conclude that
symbolic geographic trademarks may do some harm by weakening or
commercializing the meanings associated with culturally significant places. The
value of metaphor, however, even in a commercial context, and the complex
ways in which meanings are created, counsel against any dramatic measures to
restrict the use of evocative trademarks in order to protect the symbolic value of
geography.
II. GEOGRAPHIC TERMS As TRADEMARKS
The United States Trademark Act,14 commonly known as the Lanham Act,
defines a "trademark" as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish ... goods ... from those
13. See infra Part lII.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000).
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manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods."'1 5 For
centuries, producers of goods have used some form of symbol or. hallmark to
distinguish their goods from those of other producers. Identifying marks allow
producers to reap the rewards of a reputation for quality, and they protect
consumers who might otherwise mistake the inferior goods of one producer for
the sought-after goods of another. In this respect, trademarks encourage the
production of higher quality products.16 Trademark owners may sue to prevent
the unauthorized use of their mark, or a similar mark, under circumstances likely
to lead to confusion.
17
The symbol adopted to identify the source of a product often communicates
other messages as well-a fact that greatly complicates the situation. Consider
the name "Hawaiian Punch." "Hawaiian Punch" is a brand name, signifying that
the associated goods are produced by Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., a division of
Cadbury Schweppes. 18 Few consumers may be aware of its corporate ownership,
or know that it had earlier passed through the hands of Del Monte and Procter
& Gamble, but that history is immaterial to the status of "Hawaiian Punch" as a
trademark.1 9 If the producers of a similar beverage were to use that well-known
name, consumers would likely be misled into believing that this Hawaiian Punch
came from the usual source. But corporate origin is not all that the name
"Hawaiian Punch" communicates to the consumer. Because the name has been
used consistently over many decades to refer to a particular type of beverage-a
sweet, red, fruit-juice concoction-a consumer would also expect the name to
indicate that type of beverage. A consumer who, for example, ordered
"Hawaiian Punch" from a restaurant menu would be disappointed at receiving a
Schweppes ginger ale.
Even a consumer who had never experienced Hawaiian Punch before could
infer something about the product from its name. Originally, the name alluded to
the importation from Hawaii of some of the tropical juices-pineapple, passion
fruit, papaya, and guava-that give the beverage its distinctive flavor. Although
the juices might now have a different source, the name "Hawaiian Punch" still
suggests a tropical-fruit beverage. In a less literal fashion, the word "Hawaiian"
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The term "service mark" refers to "any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish the services of one person ... from the
services of others and to indicate the source of the services." Id. There is little difference in the legal
treatment of trademarks and service marks, so I will use the term "trademark" in the looser sense that
includes service marks.
16. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
3:5 (2006) ("If there were no way to tell good products from the poor products, why bother to sell
anything but the poorest? ... Without trademarks and the identifying function they serve, competition
in product quality could not exist.").
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (infringement of registered trademark); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(infringement of unregistered trademark).
18. Hawaiian Punch, http://www.cadburyschweppes.com/EN/Brands/About/Beverages/factsheet-
hawaiianpunch.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
19. The definitions of "trademark" and "service mark" in the Lanham Act admit the possibility
that the source of the product or service is unknown. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
1184 [Vol. 79
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also evokes certain associations that would be useful in marketing the product-
images, perhaps, of surf, sunshine, informality, and ease. Finally, and most
importantly from the perspective of a long-established name like "Hawaiian
Punch," the words trigger a host of product-related memories for consumers
conditioned by experience and advertising. It is the keystone of the brand.20 The
brand identifies the product in a competitive marketplace and serves as the locus
of its good will. The brand name "Hawaiian Punch" is the reason that Cadbury
Schweppes paid $203 million to Proctor & Gamble for the privilege of selling a
fruit drink.
When a trademark communicates nothing but brand origin, as may be true
of certain manufactured terms like "Exxon" or "Kodak," trademark rules can be
relatively uncomplicated. When a trademark communicates several messages at
once, however, the law cannot overlook either the interest of consumers in
receiving accurate information or the legitimate need of competitors to
communicate their own, similar messages. If the juices do not come from Hawaii,
but the name makes it appear that they do, or if another beverage producer
wants to communicate, through its brand name, that its fruit punch also features
the flavors of Hawaii, the objective of avoiding confusion as to source by
securing exclusive rights to the trademark must be balanced against other
necessities of a fair and competitive marketplace.
One of the ways the Lanham Act deals with this is by categorizing potential
trademarks according to their "distinctiveness."21 The most distinctive marks are
those symbols, like the word "Kodak," created simply to be trademarks. These
marks are "fanciful. ' 22 Only slightly less distinctive are symbols drawn from
existing lexicons but used to identify products with which the symbols have no
natural or obvious relationship.23 These "arbitrary" marks might include
"Penguin Books" or "Apple Computer." Terms that are not so arbitrary, but
that communicate, indirectly, something about the characteristics of the product
are "suggestive."2 4 The name "Irish Spring" for soap suggests a fresh,
invigorating scent. "Descriptive" marks communicate information about the
goods more directly. "One-A-Day" vitamins are taken once a day, and "Chunky
Soup" describes the nature of the product. Finally, the least distinctive terms are
those that refer categorically to the type of product with which they are
20. See generally Tom Blackett, What is a Brand?, in BRANDS AND BRANDING 13, 17-18 (Rita
Clifton & John Simmons with Sameena Ahmad et al. eds., 2004) (discussing how "underlying appeals"
of brands draw consumers to purchase certain brands).
21. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (describing five categories
of trademark distinctiveness).
22. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, §§ 11:5-11:6 (describing "fanciful" marks as strongest
trademarks due to their novelty).
23. See id. § 11:11 ("Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc., that are in
common linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither suggest nor
describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services.").
24. Id. § 11:62.
2006]
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associated-e.g., "thermos." 5 Some of these "generic" terms, such as "aspirin,"
"cellophane," and "thermos," were once distinctive trademarks but through
indiscriminate use came to symbolize the type of product more than its source.
26
The most distinctive marks-fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks-are
most easily registered as trademarks and are afforded the strongest protection.
27
Descriptive marks are protected more reluctantly because consumers are less
likely to perceive them as brands and because competitors have a greater need to
adopt similar marks.28 Descriptive marks are only protected as trademarks when
they have developed "secondary meaning." 29 Secondary meaning arises when,
through extensive use of the term as a brand, consumers understand as an
indication of source a term that originally was only descriptive. 30 For instance,
when the vitamins were first introduced, consumers might have perceived the
term "One-A-Day" as descriptive, but after many years of advertising,
consumers would likely perceive the term today primarily as a brand name. In
contrast, generic terms cannot be protected as trademarks at all, regardless of
secondary meaning, because competitors need ample freedom to refer to their
products by their generic name.
31
These categories are difficult to separate, even though the consequences
matter. One could describe "Light Beer," for example, as either descriptive or
25. See id. § 12:1 (noting that generic names of products and services are "antithesis" of a
trademark).
26. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963)
(holding that the term "thermos" had become generic); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 12:1 (outlining
transformation from distinctive trademark to generic term).
27. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Whether a mark is strong or
weak, however, depends not only on the type of mark, but also on its strength in the marketplace.
Marks that are well-known and unusual are stronger, more distinctive marks likely to be afforded
broader protections. See McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)
("[Wihile these categories can be useful for analytical purposes, the strength of a mark depends
ultimately on its distinctiveness, or its 'origin-indicating' quality, in the eyes of the purchasing
public.").
28. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
29. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1052(e)-(f) (2000) (providing that descriptive marks may not be registered unless mark "has become
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce"). After a trademark becomes "incontestable," which
occurs after five years of continuous postregistration use in commerce, a descriptive mark can no
longer be challenged on the ground that it lacks secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1065; Park 'N Fly, Inc.
v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197 (1985).
30. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, §§ 15:5-15:6.
31. For example, the Second Circuit has stated:
It is a bedrock principle of the trademark law that no trader may acquire the exclusive
right to the use of a term by which the covered goods or services are designated in the
language .... This rule protects the interest of the consuming public in understanding the
nature of goods offered for sale, as well as a fair marketplace among competitors by insuring
that every provider may refer to his goods as what they are.
Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999).
1186 [Vol. 79
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generic. 32 The categories of distinctiveness are "central tones in a spectrum. '33 In
addition, other principles may temper the effects of categorization. For example,
competitors who are permitted to use generic terms that were originally adopted
by others as brand names (e.g., "thermos" 34 or "shredded wheat" 35), may still be
required under principles of unfair competition to adopt "every reasonable
means" to distinguish their product from the original. 36 On the other hand,
competitors may still use terms protected as trademarks so long as the use is a
"fair use." The Lanham Act defines "fair use" as the good-faith use of a
trademarked term, by someone other than the owner of the trademark, not as a
trademark but simply to describe that person's own goods.37 The judicious
balancing of these principles should minimize consumer confusion as to source
while maximizing competition on the merits.
In the case of geographic terms used as trademarks, achieving that
equilibrium has proven particularly difficult. For many centuries, certain nations,
regions, or cities have been known for goods of higher quality or distinctive
characteristics. Venice was famous for glass, Sheffield for steel, Bordeaux for
wine. Local reputations might arise from such factors as climate, available
materials, skilled workforces, or the luck that one or more producers of
distinctive goods happened to be located in a particular locality. Naturally, when
goods from a particular area command a premium, sellers marketing those goods
call attention to their origin-sometimes integrating that information into their
brand name. Dealers in products from less respected regions, if unscrupulous,
may use their trademark to suggest a more desirable origin. If either successfully
claims the geographic term as a trademark, other sellers are restricted. Dealing
with geographic terms descriptive, or misdescriptive, of the origins of the goods
is much like dealing with terms descriptive, or misdescriptive, of other aspects of
the associated product. In this case, however, issues of fair competition mix with
heightened considerations of tradition, heritage, and local pride. People care
profoundly about place, particularly if it is the place where they live and work.
That deep regard may be why, as discussed in the next section, the law of
geographic trademarks has changed repeatedly.
32. See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
that "Lite" is a generic term for beer).
33. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
34. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963)
(finding "thermos" generic).
35. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938) (finding "shredded wheat"
generic).
36. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 121 (maintaining that even though "shredded wheat" is generic, Kellogg
must still "use every reasonable means to prevent confusion"); see also King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 581
(limiting Aladdin's use of "thermos" to lowercase letters and following name "Aladdin").
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
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A. From "Mischievous Monopolies" to "Secondary Meaning"
Canal Co. v. Clark38 is an important early case on geographic trademarks.
For an extended period, the plaintiff had been the sole producer of coal from the
Lackawanna Valley of Pennsylvania. Eventually, other producers mined coal
from the same strata, but only Canal Company used the term "Lackawanna
coal" as a brand name.39 Others adopted names like "Pittston coal" and
"Scranton coal." 40 Although the other coal was so similar that it could not easily
be distinguished, 4t the original "Lackawanna coal" carried the best reputation
for quality.42 Clark, a dealer in coal, advertised his Pittston and Scranton coal as
"Lackawanna coal," leading to the dispute.
The Supreme Court observed that geographic terms, like generic names, do
not indicate any particular firm or individual, and they can be used with equal
right by any producer of goods from the same region: "They point only at the
place of production, not to the producer ... ."43 Moreover, if geographic terms
were subject to exclusive rights, the result would be "mischievous monopolies":
Could such phrases, as "Pennsylvania wheat," "Kentucky hemp,"
"Virginia tobacco," or "Sea Island cotton," be protected as trade-
marks; could any one prevent all others from using them, or from
selling articles produced in the districts they describe under those
appellations, it would greatly embarrass trade, and secure exclusive
rights to individuals in that which is the common right of many.
44
Even if the use of the geographic term led to mistake on the part of
consumers, the Court implied that nothing could be done. If the geographic label
is "just as true in its application to [the defendant's] goods as it is to [the
plaintiff's] ... there is no legal or moral wrong done. '45 Put simply-perhaps too
simply-"equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.
'46
Although any harm suffered by Canal Company could be blamed on its lack
of foresight in choosing an unimaginative trademark, it is still surprising to see
the Court dismiss the interests of consumers so easily. The coal sold by the
defendant might have been "Lackawanna coal" in a literal sense, without being
what the customers thought they had purchased.
38. 80 U.S. 311 (1871).
39. Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 313-14.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 322.
42. Id. at 314.
43. Id. at 324.
44. Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 324.
45. Id. at 327.
46. Id.; see also id. at 328 ("If the public are led into mistake, it is by the truth, not by any false
pretence. If the complainants' sales are diminished, it is because they are not the only producers of
Lackawanna coal, and not because of any fraud of the defendant."). The court found "no evidence
that [the defendant] has attempted to sell his coal as and for the coal of the plaintiffs," even though the
use of the name "Lackawanna coal" seems itself to constitute some evidence. Id.
1188 [Vol. 79
TRADEMARKS
Some years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a
different point of view in American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch
Co.4 7 The plaintiff, the first manufacturer of watches in Waltham, Massachusetts,
originally used the term "Waltham" in its geographical sense, but with the
passage of time the public came to understand the term as signifying watches
made by the plaintiff.48 "Waltham," in other words, had developed "a secondary
meaning."49 The defendant, who also made watches in Waltham, claimed equal
right to advertise its place of business, including marking its watches with its
address, as was customary.50 The defendant argued that whatever its intent in
using the name "Waltham," and whatever effect that use might have in diverting
trade from the plaintiff, it was the "plaintiff's folly" to "associate[] the fame of its
merits with the city where it makes its wares, instead, of with its own name."
5'
Having acted foolishly, the plaintiff could not restrict the defendant's freedom to
advertise its goods or burden it with the costs of a disclaimer (which, the
defendant said, would "discredit" the defendant's watches "in advance"). 52 The
Court disagreed, stating:
Whatever might have been the doubts some years ago, we think that
now it is pretty well settled that the plaintiff, merely on the strength of
having been first in the field, may put later comers to the trouble of
taking such reasonable precautions as are commercially practicable to
prevent their lawful names and advertisements from deceitfully
diverting the plaintiff's custom.
53
In 1901, the United States Supreme Court, considering the application of
the word "Elgin" to watches, adopted a similar position.5 4 The Court
acknowledged the "general rule" that words describing the place of manufacture
cannot be reserved as trademarks55 and adhered to the principle of Canal Co. v.
Clark that first comers cannot deny others the right to advertise the geographic
origins of their goods.5 6 The Court nevertheless held that if the term had
developed a secondary meaning as a brand, the use of the term could be limited
under principles of unfair competition, so as to avoid deceiving the public.5 7 The
defendant in such a case could be required to use the geographic term only in its
primary sense to avoid confusion with respect to the product's origin.
58
These four essential points-the general rule that geographic terms cannot
be protected as trademarks, the exception for terms that have developed
47. 53 N.E. 141 (Mass 1899). Judge Holmes authored the opinion.





53. Am. Waltham, 53 N.E. at 142.
54. Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. 111. Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665,673-74 (1901).
55. Id. at 673.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 673-74.
58. Id. at 674.
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secondary meaning, the potential restraint under principles of unfair competition
when trademark rights are not available, and, when trademark rights are
available, the continued freedom of others to use a geographic term in its
geographic sense-would all be embodied in the Lanham Act. Section 2(e) of
the Lanham Act denies trademark protection, as a general rule, to a mark that is
"primarily geographically descriptive." 59 Section 2(f), however, allows such a
mark to be registered if it has "become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce"-the Act's reference to secondary meaning.6° Yet, registration does
not bar all use by rivals. Even a term registered as a trademark can be used by
someone else, so long as it is used fairly and in good faith, and not as a
trademark but only to describe the geographic origin of that person's goods.
61 If
a geographic term has not developed secondary meaning, its use in a deceptive
manner may still be restricted under principles of unfair competition embodied
in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Section 43(a) permits a civil action to
prevent the use of any word or symbol in a manner likely to cause mistake as to
the origin, sponsorship, or affiliation of goods.62
Some potential ambiguity lies in the term "primarily geographically
descriptive." The 1905 Trademark Act barred the registration of marks that were
"merely a geographic name or term." 63 This language was interpreted to ban
registration even of geographic names that were not well-known, or that had
alternative nongeographic meanings.64 If the term submitted as a trademark
could be found in an atlas, anywhere in the world, the Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") would reject the application, even if few consumers would be
aware of such a place (e.g., "Kem"), or if consumers would never assume that
the term (e.g., "Antarctica") was to be understood as the place where the goods
originated. 65 Although this "gazetteer method" had the benefit of clarity, the
Lanham Act demands a more subtle analysis.
In re Charles S. Loeb Pipes, Inc.66 concerned the term "Old Dominion," a
long-used nickname for the state of Virginia, but perhaps not a term whose
geographical connotation would be recognized by all consumers. 67 The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB" or "Board") held that such a term
could be considered "primarily geographically descriptive" under the Lanham
Act if it "primarily or immediately" conveyed geographical meaning to
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006). The Lanham Act makes an exception for
collective marks and certification marks, discussed infra at Part II.D.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
63. Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 5(b), 33 Stat. 724, 725-26 (1905), amended by Lanham Act,
ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
64. See In re Charles S. Loeb Pipes, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238, 242-43 (T.T.A.B. 1975)
(refusing to trademark any geographic name under Trademark Act of 1905).
65. See id. at 243 (citing cases in which obscure geographic terms were precluded from
registration).
66. 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
67. Loeb, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 241-43.
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customers, and the goods in fact came from that place. 68 If so, the term could be
registered as a trademark only upon the demonstration of secondary meaning.
69
On the other hand, "[i]f the notation in question does not convey an immediate
or readily recognizable geographical significance to the average consumer," the
mark is not geographically descriptive but "manifestly arbitrary." 70 Terms whose
geographic sense is "minor or obscure and would not be known to the average
purchaser of the goods" 71 fall into the latter category. 72 But having referred to
the "average consumer," the T-AB shifted its focus to a hypothetical "segment
of the purchasing public" whose understanding might be easier to hypothesize:
Obviously, not all people throughout the country are aware of this
significance of "OLD DOMINION", and manifestly it is doubtful that
many know the nicknames for all or even a portion of the fifty states.
But, this is of no moment.., for it is sufficient for our purposes that it
is an accepted nickname for a state and would be recognized as such by
a segment of the purchasing public.
73
Because a "meaningful segment of the purchasing public" in Virginia and
surrounding areas would identify "Old Dominion" with the state of Virginia, the
TTAB treated the term as one having a primary geographical significance.
74
B. "Deceptive" and "Deceptively Misdescriptive" Geographic Marks
For our purposes, the most important geographic marks are those
identifying a place from which the goods do not originate. Such uses of
geography have long been regarded with suspicion. As a Michigan federal court
observed in 1897, "where the name is appropriated by a manufacturer who
resides at a different place, it very naturally starts an inquiry as to what is the
motive-what is the object-which the party sought to attain." 75 When the name
"Chicago Waists" appears on corsets from California and Kalamazoo, one can
surmise that the purpose is to take advantage of someone else's reputation.
76
Section 2(e) of the Lanham Act originally afforded the same treatment to
terms that, when used in connection with the goods of the applicant, were
"primarily geographically descriptive" of them, or "primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive." In each case, registration of the term as a trademark
68. Id. at 244.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 243. ("The word 'primarily' [in section 2(e) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)]
should not be overlooked, for it is not the intent of the federal statute to refuse registration of a mark
where the geographic meaning is minor, obscure, remote, or unconnected with the goods." (quoting
World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's World Carpets, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609,612-13 (5th Cir. 1971)).
72. In re Dixie Ins. Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 514,516 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
73. Loeb, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 245.
74. Id. at 246.




would be denied unless secondary meaning was established under section 2(f).
77
Once a term had been used sufficiently as a brand name to create a public
impression, the term might be registrable as a trademark even though it was, in
geographic terms, "deceptively misdescriptive."
78
Originally, the TTAB adopted the same test, traceable to In re Charles S.
Loeb Pipes, to determine if a mark was "primarily geographically descriptive" or
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"-the difference being only
whether the goods did or did not come from the place indicated by the
geographic term.79 In either case, the question was whether the term primarily or
immediately conveyed to the average consumer (or a "meaningful segment" of
the public) a geographic significance.
80
In In re Nantucket, Inc.,81 the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA") 82 found it necessary to add a further element to identifying a
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" mark. Although the
TTAB's test was easy to administer, it did not take into account the nature of the
applicant's goods as required by section 2(e). 83 Nor did it "give appropriate
weight to the presence of 'deceptively"' in section 2(e)'s reference to
geographically misdescriptive marks.84 A term like "Alaska" might immediately
convey a geographic significance in any context, but whether it could be
characterized as deceptively misdescriptive as applied to goods not from Alaska
would depend on the nature of the goods. Applied to salmon it might be
deceptively misdescriptive, but applied to bananas it would deceive no one.
85
The missing element was consideration of "whether the public associates
the goods with the place." 86 If the public makes no "goods/place association," the
public is not deceived. In such cases-e.g., "Alaska bananas"-the public does
not perceive the mark as descriptive of geographic origin, and it is not
deceived. 87 The disputed term in this case was "Nantucket" as applied to men's
shirts made somewhere other than Nantucket Island in Massachusetts. 88 Absent
evidence that consumers seeing "Nantucket" on such a shirt would expect it to
have come from the island, registration of the mark could not be refused under
section 2(e) of the Lanham Act.
89
77. Loeb, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 242.
78. Id. at 244.
79. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687, 691 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
80. Loeb, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 244; In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 691.
81. 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
82. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the successor of the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
About the Federal Circuit, http://fedcir.gov/about.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
83. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 98.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 98 n.5.
86. Id. at 99.
87. Id. at 98 n.5, 99.
88. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 95-96.
89. Id. at 101.
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Judge Nies, who concurred in the result, agreed with the necessity of a
goods/place association but cautioned that the place did not have to be "noted
for" the goods in question for such an association to be found. 90 A consumer
might expect a shirt with a "Chicago" brand name to come from that city, even if
Chicago is not famous for shirts, simply because so many manufactured items do
come from Chicago.91
1. Distinguishing "Deceptive" and "Deceptively Misdescriptive" Marks
The renewed emphasis on the "deceptive" element of "primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive" leads to its own problems. Section
2(a) of the Lanham Act denies registration to any "deceptive" term.92 At first
blush, "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" terms, as described
in section 2(e), would seem to be a subset of those barred under section 2(a).
Unlike section 2(e), however, section 2(a) bars "deceptive" marks absolutely,
regardless of the development of secondary meaning. Because section 2(a) and
section 2(e) seem to contemplate different results, one of the difficulties in
applying the Lanham Act, at least until recently, 93 has been to distinguish
between geographically deceptive and geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks.
The TFAB took up the challenge in In re Amerise,94 where the applicant
sought to register the name "Italian Maide" together with a drawing of a woman
in peasant costume posed against a banner suggesting the Italian flag. The
applicant's goods, including tomatoes, spaghetti sauce, herbs, and grated cheese,
were not made in Italy. The PTO had denied registration under section 2(a) on
the ground that "Italian Maide" was deceptive. 95 The Board held that the
creators of the Lanham Act must have "attributed different meanings to the
terms 'deceptive' and 'primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive' and
intended these terms to be applied in different situations involving different sets
of circumstances." 96 The difference, the Board said, is that a geographic mark is
"deceptive" under section 2(a), and therefore beyond the help of secondary
meaning, only if it "involves a false assertion calculated, either planned,
designed, or implied to deceive the public as to the geographical origin of the
90. Id. at 104 (Nies, J., concurring). The Sixth Circuit endorsed this approach, stating:
Though more than a geographic name is required in order to meet the "primarily
geographically descriptive" category, there is no requirement that the challenger to a
trademark demonstrate that the area is noted for the goods in question .... The District
Court properly found that a goods/place association is made by the term regardless of
whether the area was noted for the production of those goods.
Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 1989).
91. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 102-03 (Nies, J., concurring).
92. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687, 690 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).
93. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of changes in the Act after NAFTA.
94. 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
95. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 689.
96. Id. at 690.
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goods bearing the mark. ' 97 Although including the word "implied," the Board
seemed to contemplate only deliberate acts of deception as the province of
section 2(a)-that is, "situations where a party applies a geographical
designation to a particular product knowing that it will bestow upon the product
an appearance of greater quality or saleability not actually possessed by it with
the intention thereby of inducing or misleading a particular class of consumers
into purchasing this product.'
'98
Geographic names that mislead consumers, but that are not intended to
mislead, can be left to section 2(e). While bad intent is difficult to prove, it might
be inferred when an applicant seeks to register the name of a destination that is
renowned for a particular product or service.99 The Board did not find that
"Italian Maide" was calculated to deceive, in part because some of the goods
covered by the registration (e.g., sauerkraut) were not known for their Italian
origins. 1°° As for the rest, consumers were accustomed to seeing American-made
tomato pastes and spaghetti sauces sold under Italian names, and they would not
immediately assume that the products came from Italy.
101
This emphasis on the trademark owner's intent was not destined to last. In
In re House of Windsor, Inc.,102 the examiner rejected the term "Bahia" as a
trademark for cigars, holding it "deceptive" under section 2(a).10 3 As found by
the examiner, "Bahia" is the name of a province in Brazil noted for tobacco and
cigars, and purchasers of cigars marked "Bahia" would conclude that they had
been made in Bahia or from tobacco grown there. 1° 4 This conclusion would be
false because the applicant's cigars, in fact, had no connection with Bahia.10 5 On
appeal, the TTAB reviewed once again the distinction between "deceptive" and
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" trademarks.106 The
legislative history of the Lanham Act provided little guidance, suggesting that
some of the drafters perceived no distinction, but "basic rules of statutory
construction" required that some difference be found. 10 7 Yet the Board rejected
the In re Amerise approach:
[Ilt seems to us that intent of the user of the mark should not be an
element of a case of geographical deceptiveness. In the first place,
establishing the intent of the user of the mark is a difficult proposition,
particularly at the examination level, where the Examining Attorney is
unlikely to adduce evidence of applicant's intent. Moreover, an intent
test could, conceivably, lead to the incongruous result of denying
97. Id. at 691.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 691-92.
101. Id. at 692.
102. 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
103. In re House of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 54.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 55.
106. Id. at 55-56.
107. Id. at 56.
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registration to one party where evidence of intent to deceive is present
but allowing registration of the same mark for the same goods to
another party where the evidence fails to show intent to deceive.
0 8
A better distinction would be to limit irremediable deceptiveness under
section 2(a) to those cases in which the deception was "material to the
purchasing decision."10 9 If cigar consumers were led to believe that "Bahia
cigars" were from Brazil, but did not care, the mark would be only deceptively
misdescriptive under section 2(e).110 On the other hand, if Bahia had a
reputation for cigars that moved consumers to buy these cigars in the false belief
that they came from Bahia, then "Bahia" would be a deceptive mark under
section 2(a). t1i An important consideration would be whether the goods in
question were "a principal product of the geographic region." 112 If the region
was sufficiently "renowned" that purchasers might assume the goods to have
come from that region even though few such goods were produced there (as
might be the case for "Chicago shirts"), the deception would not likely be
considered material." 3 Bahia, on other hand, produced many cigars and was
known for doing so, which was enough to show that the deception implicit in
"Bahia cigars" would be material.
114
The materiality test is consistent with the treatment of other
"misdescriptive" trademarks that might be barred under section 2(a)," 5 and the
Federal Circuit has endorsed it for geographic marks challenged as
"deceptive. '"116 As discussed infra in Part II.C, this became particularly
significant when the Federal Circuit determined that changes to the statute had
elevated the standard under section 2(e) to match that of section 2(a), in so far as
geographically misdescriptive marks are concerned.
2. "Arbitrary" Geographic Marks
When goods are actually made in the place indicated by a geographic
trademark, one naturally concludes that the mark was chosen for its descriptive





113. In re House of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 57.
114. Id.
115. See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that general test for
deception under section 2(a) involves three questions: "(1) Is the term misdescriptive of the character,
quality, function, composition or use of the goods? (2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to
believe that the misdescription actually describes the goods? (3) If so, is the misdescription likely to
affect the decision to purchase?").
116. See Institut National des Appellations d'Origine v. Vintners Int'l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("A mark may be established as a geographically deceptive mark under section 2(a)
by showing that it is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive under section 2(e)(2), and




quality and that it is likely to be interpreted as such. 117 Why else would watches
made in Waltham have been named "Waltham" watches? 118 But when the goods
are not from the place indicated by their trademark, one must consider not only
the possibility of fraud, but the possibility that the name was never meant to be
taken in a literal, descriptive sense.
Some words of geographic origin are generic when coupled with certain
classes of goods-e.g., "Bermuda" shorts or "English" muffins. They cannot be
reserved as trademarks, but not because any consumer would believe that the
shorts really came from Bermuda or the muffins from England. They cannot be
reserved as trademarks because they are understood as naming a variety of
goods, and anyone selling that variety of goods must have an equal right to use
the term. 119 Some pseudogeographic terms might be categorized as fanciful
because no such place exists, except in the mythology of advertising. "Nature
Valley" probably falls in this category. Other such terms might be deemed
suggestive. 120 Section 2(e) of the Lanham Act refers to marks that are "primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive."1 21 Hence, names having geographic
significance should be denied trademark protection only if consumers would
perceive them, incorrectly, as descriptive of the geographic origins of the
goods-if, in other words, there is a "goods/place association.'
' 22
Some geographic references are too obscure to be understood as such by
consumers. On one occasion, the Federal Circuit determined very few American
consumers would recognize "Vittel" as a town in the Voges mountain region of
France. 123 Consequently, consumers would perceive the name "Vittel" used on a
skin lotion simply as a trademark. 124 The goods/place association must be judged
from the perspective of the relevant public, "in this case the mill-run of cosmetic
purchasers, not . . . the unusually well-travelled, the aficionados of European
watering places, or ... computer operators checking out the meaning of strange
words on NEXIS."' 125 Courts have often classified obscure geographic terms as
"arbitrary" rather than "misdescriptive."'
126
Consumers may recognize a geographic term but not take the reference
literally because, as in the case of "Alaska bananas," the goods and the place are
unrelated. Courts often mention such "unconnected" terms in the same breath as
117. In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1706 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
118. See Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141,142 (Mass. 1899) (stating that
trademark holder originally used "Waltham" name to indicate geographic origin).
119. See supra note 31.
120. See In re Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 262, 262 (T.T.A.B. 1965)
(concluding that "Kentucky Turf" fertilizer did not indicate product was made in Kentucky; rather, it
suggested that using product would produce desirable result-presumably the kind of lush grass for
which Kentucky is famous).
121. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687,690 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (emphasis added).
122. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
123. In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957,959 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
124. Id.
125. I(d
126. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d 95, 99 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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those that are "minor" or "obscure," 127 dismissing them all as "arbitrary.
1 28
Some "unconnected" geographic trademarks may indeed be arbitrary in the
sense that they seem chosen without any conscious design. 129 The conjunction of
"Alaska" and "bananas," for example, is so incongruous that it is essentially
meaningless. 130 As in the case of "Penguin Books," any other name would do
just as well. But "Alaska bananas" is only a popular hypothetical. Genuine
"unconnected" trademarks often reveal more deliberate origins.
Consider some of the geographic trademarks described by the Sixth Circuit
as "entirely arbitrary": "European" health spas, "Nantucket" shirts, and
"Dutch" paint. 13' The United States District Court for the District of South
Dakota deemed "European health spas" an "arbitrary" trademark, but
explained that it was used "primarily to convey romantic overtones." 132 In In re
Nantucket, the registrant argued that the name "Nantucket" was "suggestive of
fashionable summer resort stylishness."'' 33 The CCPA seemed to agree. 134 In
National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 135 the Ninth Circuit approved the terms "Dutch"
and "Dutch Boy" as trademarks for paint. 136 Although the court did not
speculate on the reason for the name, finding only that it would not be taken
literally, 37 it is difficult to imagine that "Dutch" was chosen with any less care
than "European" or "Nantucket." "Dutch" communicates a feeling that
127. E.g., In re Hiromichi Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("A mark is not primarily
geographic where the geographic meaning is obscure, minor, remote, or not likely to be connected
with the goods." (citing In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99)); In re House of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
53, 55 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (holding that geographical meaning of "Bahia" is not "minor, obscure, remote,
or unconnected with applicant's goods").
128. See, e.g., Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 594
(6th Cir. 1989) (noting that unconnected geographic terms are "entirely arbitrary"); In re Nantucket,
677 F.2d at 99 ("[I]f there be no connection of the geographical meaning of the mark with the goods in
the public mind, that is, if the mark is arbitrary when applied to the goods, registration should not be
refused .... ).
129. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 110
(2002) provides several definitions of "arbitrary." The meaning seemingly meant in this context is
"based on random or convenient selection or choice rather than on reason or nature." Id. at 110.
130. See In re House of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 55 (discussing "Alaska bananas"
hypothetical).
131. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby, 871 F.2d at 594. The court also mentioned "Touraine" coffee and
"World" carpets but these need not be considered geographic terms at all-"Touraine" because its
geographic origins would be unknown to most American consumers, La Touraine Coffee Co. v.
Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1946), and "World" because it is too broad to refer to
any particular region, World Carpets, 438 F.2d at 486. As Judge Nies remarked in her In re Nantucket
opinion, "Names such as SUN, WORLD, GLOBE, MARS, or MILKY WAY are ... arbitrary, not
informational; competitors do not need to use the terms to compete effectively." 677 F.2d at 105 (Nies,
J., concurring).
132. Health Indus., Inc. v. European Health Spas, 489 F. Supp. 860,868 (D.S.D. 1980).
133. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 101 n.10.
134. See id. at 101 (finding no evidence that consumers would take "Nantucket" literally).
135. 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1955).




"Chinese" does not, even if it is difficult to put one's finger on what that feeling
is. The terms "fanciful,"' 138 "fictitious,"' 39 or "suggestive' 140 for such uses of
geographic names come nearer to the truth than "arbitrary." A Restatement
hypothetical, quoted at length in In re Nantucket, provides helpful examples:
Thus Gibraltar may be a trade-mark for automobiles since there is no
likelihood that such use of the name would lead purchasers to suppose
that there is any particular relation between the automobiles and the
geographical locations known by that name, or any likelihood that it
would seriously interfere with the freedom of merchants at Gibraltar to
use that name. Again, Ethiopian may be a proper trade-mark for
ladies' stockings; for, while suggestive of a certain color and sheen, it is
only fancifully so and there is no likelihood that other merchants may
have occasion properly to use the name Ethiopia on stockings since
there is no factor of importance associating stockings with Ethiopia.
Such is also the case of Pacific for bread or Arctic for refrigerators.
14 1
Note that the absent "relation" between automobiles and Gibraltar is a
physical relation. A symbolic relationship is another matter. Just as Prudential
Insurance promises a metaphorical "piece of the rock," a "Gibraltar automobile"
suggests a product as enduring as granite. "Arctic Refrigerator" is enough to
make one shiver. When courts describe a geographic name as "unconnected with
the goods," they plainly speak in the context of something equally literal-a
"logical connection" based on the physical location where the goods are
produced or seem to be produced. 4 2 They do not speak of a symbolic connection
that might be formed in the imagination of the consumer.
In one sense, the distinction is unimportant. The Lanham Act treats
fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks in essentially the same way, 43 so a
seemingly random choice like "Pacific bread" would carry the same
consequences as a more evocative choice like "Gibraltar automobile." I will
argue in Part II.C, however, that the symbolic use of geography is an increasingly
significant aspect of contemporary marketing, and that ignoring nonliteral, but
quite meaningful, connections between place and product threatens to obscure
some important matters of policy, particularly in the era of upheaval following
the post-North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") amendments to
the Lanham Act.
138. E.g., In re Jacques Bernier, Inc., 894 F.2d 389, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Nat'l Lead, 223 F.2d at
199; In re Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 262,262 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
139. E.g., In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d at 100; Nat'l Lead, 223 F.2d at 199; La Touraine Coffee
Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1946).
140. E.g., Health Indus., Inc. v. European Health Spas, 489 F. Supp. 860, 868 (D.S.D. 1980); In re
Int'l Minerals, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 262.
141. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 100 n.8 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 720 cmt. d (1938)).
142. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 595 (6th Cir.
1989) (finding that term is geographically descriptive where court can make logical connection
between product and geographical term).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
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C. Geographic Trademarks After NAFTA
European nations, having long histories of regional industry and countless
local reputations to celebrate, often use place names to differentiate one type of
product from another. Popular varieties of wine and cheese, for example, are
commonly named for the European cities or regions where they are produced.
Immigrants to the new world, bringing European culture with them, sometimes
named American products after fondly remembered European predecessors
t14 -
e.g., burgundy wine or limburger cheese-leading to embarrassing situations. For
example, from the French perspective, "Chablis" denotes a town in France and
the fine wines for which it is known. But a United States court must find
"Chablis" a generic term for wine because in the United States the term has
neither brand nor geographic significance. 145 Europeans regard such uses as
misappropriation. 146
The United States, for many decades, declined to join in international
agreements that would have restricted the use of foreign geographic names used
generically in this country.1 47 Following a World Trade Organization ("WTO")
agreement, however, Congress amended section 2(a) of the Lanham Act to bar
registration of "a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection
with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods."
1 4 8
While this will not prevent an American vintner from calling its wine "Chablis,"
it will prevent such names from being adopted as trademarks and wielded as
such. With wider implications, Congress changed sections 2(e) and 2(f) after
NAFTA. Section 2(e) now divides marks that are "primarily geographically
descriptive" (section 2(e)(2)) and marks that are "primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive" (section 2(e)(3)). The former, as before, can be
registered if they have "become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce"-in other words, if they have developed secondary meaning. 149 But
144. Burkhart Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks - The Road from Doha, 93
TRADEMARK REP. 964,988 (2003).
145. See Institut National des Appellations d'Origine v. Vintners Int'l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[N]o reasonable factfinder could have found the term 'Chablis' to be used in the
United States as anything other than a generic name for a type of wine with certain general
characteristics.").
146. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 14:18 (describing European Union efforts to "claw back"
generic terms).
147. See, e.g., id. § 14:1.50 (describing Lisbon Agreement of 1958, which United States did not
join).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000); 19 U.S.C. § 3501(9) (2000). The amendment became effective on
January 1, 1996. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 523, 108 Stat. 4809, 4982
(1994) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000)) (indicating that amendment is effective one
year after WTO Agreement becomes effective in United States); Proclamation No. 6780, 60 Fed. Reg.
15,845 (Mar. 23, 1995) (stating that WTO Agreement became effective in United States on January 1,
1995).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f).
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the latter cannot be registered unless they developed secondary meaning before
December 8, 1993.150
The apparent effect of this change is to narrow the range of geographic
trademarks eligible for protection by denying "primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive" marks the saving grace of secondary meaning.
Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions discovered no change in the definition of a
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" mark. For example, in In
re Save Venice New York, Inc.,151 the court reviewed the rejection of trademarks
consisting of "The Venice Collection," "Save Venice Inc.," and an image of the
winged lion of St. Mark. The marks were used by a nonprofit New York
corporation dedicated to the preservation of Venice, Italy, but few of the goods
it sold actually came from Venice.15 2 The court affirmed the rejection under
section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act, applying the same test developed before the
post-NAFTA revisions.1 53 That test denies registration to a mark if "(1) the
mark's primary significance is a generally known geographic location; and (2)
consumers would reasonably believe the applicant's goods are connected with
the geographic location in the mark, when in fact they are not."15 By
demonstrating that Venice is known for producing the kinds of goods sold by the
applicant, or at least related goods, the examiner had supplied the necessary
goods/place association.
1 55
In 2003, matters changed abruptly when the Federal Circuit decided In re
California Innovations, Inc.,156 where the applicant sought to register the mark
"California Innovations" for backpacks, tote bags, and similar gear. Reviewing
the history of judicial and PTO implementation of the Lanham Act, the court
found that prior to the NAFTA amendments it was much easier for the PTO to
reject applications as "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"
under section 2(e) than as "deceptive" under section 2(a). 157 Section 2(e) focused
on the "distinctiveness" of the mark (i.e., whether it was descriptive or
misdescriptive) rather than on its tendency to mislead.158 The latter was the
province of section 2(a) and burdened the PTO with demonstrating that the
150. Id.
151. 259 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
152. In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d at 1349-50.
153. Id. at 1352, 1356.
154. Id. at 1352.
155. Id. at 1354-55.
156. 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
157. In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d at 1337.
158. See id., explaining that:
In the pre-NAFTA era, the focus on distinctiveness overshadowed the deceptiveness
aspect of § [2(e)(2)] and made it quite easy for the PTO to deny registration on the principal
register to geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks under § [2(e)(2)]. On the other
hand, the deception requirement of § [2(a)] protected against fraud and could not be
overlooked. Therefore, the PTO had significantly more difficulty denying registration based
on that higher standard.
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deception was material.159 The possibility of redemption through secondary
meaning, an escape unavailable to marks rejected under section 2(a),
counterbalanced the relative ease with which a mark could be rejected under
section 2(e). Nevertheless, "NAFTA and its implementing legislation obliterated
the distinction between geographically deceptive marks and primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks."' 60 By removing the benefit of
secondary meaning from the latter, the changes refocused attention on the
"deceptive" component of "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive."'
61
If the consequences of disqualification under section 2(e)(3) now are just as
dire, and just as irreversible, as disqualification under section 2(a), then, the
court reasoned, the test should be the same. 62 Now one has to demonstrate,
under section 2(e)(3), that the deception inherent in the false goods/place
association "is material to the consumer's decision to purchase those goods.
' 163
In other words, Congress's post-NAFTA amendments made challenging
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" marks more difficult.
Professor Mary LaFrance has advanced a number of arguments against the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the NAFTA revisions.164 At least one curious
result is worth pointing out here. 165 Because the grandfather clause of section
2(f) allows "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" marks to be
registered if they developed secondary meaning before December 8, 1993,166 one
must conclude either (1) that such marks are registrable even though they are
deceptive under section 2(a), which was not the case before the NAFTA
revisions and still is not the case for other deceptive marks; (2) that the term
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" means different things in
section 2(e)(3) and section 2(f)-materially deceptive in the first instance but not
159. Id. (distinguishing finality of decision under section 2(a) of Lanham Act with temporary
nature of section 2(e)(2), which could be challenged based on acquired distinctiveness).
160. Id. at 1338.
161. Id. at 1339-40.
162. In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d at 1340. The court explained:
Because both of these categories are subject to permanent denial of registration, the PTO
may not simply rely on lack of distinctiveness to deny registration, but must make the more
difficult showing of public deception. In other words, by placing geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks under subsection (e)(3) in the same fatal circumstances as deceptive




164. See generally Mary LaFrance, Innovations Palpitations: The Confusing Status of
Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 125, 141-48 (2004) (arguing that the
Federal Circuit's interpretation is contrary to the intent of the legislative and standard rules of
statutory construction).
165. See id. at 146 (discussing grandfather clause in section 2(f) of Lanham Act, which applies to
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks under section 2(e)(3) but not deceptive
marks under section 2(a)).
166. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(0 (West 1997 & Supp. 2006).
20061
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
in the latter; or (3) that the grandfather clause is meaningless because any mark
it saves must be struck down under section 2(a). None of these alternatives
seems plausible. Nevertheless, even if the intent of the NAFTA amendments was
to make trademark protection for borrowed geographic names less available, the
result, barring further action by Congress, review by the Supreme Court, or an
en banc change of direction by the Federal Circuit, has been just the opposite.
D. Claims of Trademark Infringement or Unfair Competition Based on the Use
of Geographic Terms
So far we have discussed the registrability of geographic trademarks, which
generally tracks the enforceability of geographic trademarks against others.
Failure to grant affirmative rights to a geographic trademark does not, however,
prevent the use of the term as a brand name. The Save Venice Corporation, for
example, still can sell its merchandise under that name even though its
trademark was refused. The corporation is simply limited in its ability to prevent
others from using a similar name. Because businesses prefer to use names that
they can reserve to themselves, preventing the registration of geographic
trademarks should discourage their selection as brand names. Yet one must look
elsewhere to force a business to discontinue the use of a trademark.
One way is to register the mark first, perhaps as a certification mark. A
certification mark is a word or symbol used by persons other than the owner of
the mark to certify characteristics such as "regional ... origin."1 67 Section 4 of
the Lanham Act provides for the registration of certification marks, including
indications of regional origin, by individuals or governments that exercise
legitimate control over the marks. 168 The state of Wisconsin, for example, could
register a mark for "Wisconsin Cheese." In this case, registration would not be
hampered by its geographic descriptiveness. Certification marks may hold less
attraction for private interests because only parties who do not produce the
goods in question can own them, and permission to use the certification mark
must be granted to anyone whose product meets the certification criteria. 16
9
Private organizations might consider a collective mark, defined in the
Lanham Act as a mark "used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or
other collective group. ' 170 Section 4 of the Lanham Act authorizes collective
marks indicating regional origin,171 and such a mark might be used, for example,
by an association of Wisconsin cheese producers. The power of collective marks
and certification marks is limited in some respects. The fair use defense still
allows others to describe, in good faith, the geographic origin of their goods.
172
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1054.
169. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 19:92; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (allowing filing of petition
for cancellation of registration where registrant produces or markets goods or services under
certification mark).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1054.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
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Collective marks and certification marks also are limited, like any other mark, to
the class of goods specified in the application for registration.
1 73
Another way to control the use of geographic terms in brand names and
advertising is through an action claiming unfair competition. A federal claim of
unfair competition may be brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act "by
any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged," when a
term has been used to misrepresent the geographic origins of a product.
174
Several jewelry manufacturers located in the Black Hills region of South Dakota,
who sold their distinctive style of gold jewelry as "Black Hills Gold Jewelry,"
successfully invoked section 43(a) to prevent the sale, using the same name, of
similarly styled gold jewelry manufactured elsewhere. 175 This outcome did not
require proof that "Black Hills Gold Jewelry" had developed secondary meaning
as a brand name. 176 It was enough that the defendants' use of "Black Hills"
conveyed a false sense of geographic origin, a problem exacerbated by
advertising calling attention to South Dakota traditions and employing images of
Mount Rushmore.177 The plaintiffs succeeded because the term "Black Hills"
conveys a geographical meaning. 7 8 If "Black Hills" primarily referred to a style
of jewelry, then the term would not have misdescribed the defendant's
product. 179 Thus, in Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co.,18° the
traditional Swiss manufacturers of the "Swiss Army Knife" failed to prevent the
use of that term for a knife manufactured in China because "Swiss" indicated a
type of knife (the type favored by the Swiss Army), rather than a place of
manufacture.181
Although neither "Black Hills" nor "Swiss" were used as brand names,
nothing in section 43(a) prevents its application to geographic terms embedded
in trademarks where the term misrepresents the geographic origin of the goods.
Where the geographic term would not be understood in a literal sense, however,
(e.g., "Alaska bananas") or where the development of secondary meaning has
overcome the original geographic meaning of the term, the element of
"misrepresentation" would be absent.
III. EMOTION AND SYMBOLISM IN CONTEMPORARY MARKETING
When courts reflect on the messages conveyed by geographic trademarks,
they tend to think in literal terms. If a geographic trademark invokes a well-
known place-a place consumers are likely to associate with this type of goods-
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
175. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1980).
176. Id. at 750.
177. Id. at 752.
178. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co., 633 F.2d at 752.
179. Id. at 751-52.
180. 30 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 1994).
181. Forschner, 30 F.3d at 350,356.
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consumers will conclude that the product comes from that place. If consumers do
not draw that conclusion, the usage is "arbitrary" and readily dismissed, as
though it was meaningless. Yet those who practice and study the art of
marketing do not confine their interest to messages that are so solidly grounded
in fact. Increasingly, they emphasize the importance of symbolism, both in
motivating consumers to choose a brand and in enhancing the value of products.
Because geographic terms are so rich in symbolism, it is important to consider
how trademarks rooted in geography may communicate on a more abstract level.
A. Selling Through Fact and Fancy
A classic approach to marketing emphasizes "features and benefits."
182
Features and benefits advertising for a BMW sedan might stress the car's
superior acceleration, leather trim, traction control, and resale value. The
assumption underlying such marketing is that potential consumers will weigh
those features against the features offered by other vehicles and, taking into
account their needs, choose the product offering the greatest utility. 183 This kind
of marketing appeals to the intellect and calls on the consumer to make rational
choices based on the information conveyed through various media. Even if one
could question the accuracy of the message, selective and biased as it is certain to
be, the ostensible purpose is to communicate definite, concrete information
about the product. Such advertising is said to appeal most to "[h]ighly involved
and motivated buyers" and it succeeds through "strong, rational arguments."'
184
This method of advertising is still common today, and some experts suggest that
brand names should contribute by signaling desirable product attributes.
185
On the other hand, advertisers have long recognized that consumers can be
reached by other means than rational argument. One of the first academic
studies of advertising, Walter Dill Scott's The Psychology of Advertising, first
published in 1903, recognized the power of suggestion. 186 Appropriate images in
one's advertising, Scott argued, could trigger favorable associations and link
them, consciously or otherwise, to the featured brand.187 Successful advertising,
in Scott's view, created the right kinds of associations. 188 Including an image of
182. BERND H. SCHMITT, EXPERIENTIAL MARKETING 13 (1999).
183. Id Price, of course, would be one of the factors influencing the consumer's decision.
184. Joanne Lynch & Leslie de Chernatony, The Power of Emotion: Brand Communication in
Business-to-Business Markets, 11 J. BRAND MGMT. 403,406 (2004).
185. E.g., JOE MARCONI, THE BRAND MARKETING BOOK 30 (2000) ("Try to show a benefit in
your name. Easy, quick, fresh, safe, rapid, instant, and sure are some examples of words used
commonly in brand names to suggest benefits.").
186. "We are not cold, logical machines, who take data in and then, by a logical process, come to
a reasonable conclusion." WALTER DILL SCOTT, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING 89 (Small,
Maynard & Co. 1917) (1903). Instead, we are susceptible to the power of suggestion, whether supplied
by peers or through advertising. Id. at 186.
187. Id. at 107.
188. See id. (suggesting merchant is successful if advertising produces habitual, recent, and vivid
associations with product); Paul Feldwick, Brand Communications, in BRANDS AND BRANDING, supra
note 20, at 127, at 133-34 (discussing Scott's perspective on associative power of advertising and its
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an affluent couple in an advertisement for a railway would tell consumers
nothing specific about the service, but by a process of association it might leave
them with the feeling that the railroad was a desirable way to travel.
189
At about the same time that Scott published his study, advertising executive
Charles Hopkins popularized "Reason Why" advertising. As one historian notes,
"Reason Why" advertising is anything but rational: "Hopkins refused to appeal
to a buyer's reason by listing a product's qualities; on the contrary he addressed
nonrational yearnings by suggesting the ways his client's product would
transform the buyer's life."'190 Hopkins's form of advertising shifted attention
from the product toward the "promise of a richer, fuller life." 191 To put it in
terms of contemporary beer advertising, he deemphasized the refreshing taste of
the beverage in favor of the vibrant social life enjoyed by those who partake.
Like advertising that works by association, "Reason Why" advertising relies on
the power of emotion.
192
Although emotional appeals in marketing are nothing new, it may be that
their importance has increased. 193 As production technologies have advanced
ability to influence attitudes). Scott contrasted "sympathetic" advertising images (e.g., images of
tasteful, satisfied customers) with images of unattractive people with whom Scott, and presumably
other consumers, would not wish to identify themselves. SCOTt, supra note 186, at 38-50. Scott was
also critical of an advertisement for White Star Coffee illustrated with images of frogs, which he found
"in every way disgusting." "Frogs are inherently uncanny to most persons, and to see them here as the
representatives of a particular brand of coffee serves but to instill a dislike and even abhorrence for
the product. This advertisement never made anyone eager for a cup of coffee." Id. at 209-11.
189. See SCOTT, supra note 186, at 41 ("The two persons here represented approximate my
ideals. They seem to be enjoying the train immensely. I believe that they have good taste and if they
choose the California Limited for their wedding trip that train would certainly be desirable for my
trips too.").
190. T.J. Jackson Lears, From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic
Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930, in THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980, at 1, 18 (Richard Wightman Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983).
191. Id.
192. Scott was aware of "Reason Why" advertising, but thought that "suggestion" was at least as
important as "persuasion." See SCOTT, supra note 186, at 83 (recognizing strong power of suggestion
from both friends and experts).
193. Many students of marketing find "features and benefits" advertising to be of decreasing
importance. See, e.g., SCHMITT, supra note 182, at xiii ("More and more, marketers are moving away
from traditional 'features-and-benefits' marketing toward creating experiences for their customers.").
Consumers are said to be less interested in facts and more interested in emotional fulfillment. See
MARC GOBt, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR CONNECTING BRANDS TO PEOPLE,
at xiii (2001) ("Over the last fifty years the economic base has shifted from production to consumption.
It has gravitated from the sphere of rationality to the realm of desire: from the objective to the
subjective; to the realm of psychology." (quoting Herbert Muschamp, Seductive Objects with a Sly
Sting, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1999, at E35)); Lears, supra note 190, at 27 ("The clearest illustration of this
change appeared in automobile advertising. Pre-World War I advertisements were nearly all based on
the straightforward presentation of technical details. By the twenties they were virtually devoid of
information; instead they promised style, status, or escape to an exotic 'real life' far from the reader's
ordinary experience. The earlier ads assumed a knowledgeable, rational audience; the later ones
offered therapeutic fulfillment of nonrational longings."); Sidney J. Levy, Symbols by Which We Buy,
in ADVANCING MARKETING EFFICIENCY 409-16 (L.H. Stockholm ed., 1958), reprinted in CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR, 55, 55 (James F. Engel ed., 1968) ("The great multiplicity of goods, the burgeoning of new
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and matured, many products have reached a state of "parity" where there is little
differentiating one product from another. 194 Quality is always high, and new
features are soon imitated. 195 The rational consumer, the intended target of
features and benefits advertising, is hard-pressed to decide between one brand of
laundry detergent and another when all can claim essentially the same
functionality. In this environment, the brand assumes a higher level of
importance. "Brands are the solution to what Tom Peters has dubbed 'the blight
of sameness."'19 6 How can a marketer successfully promote a brand when other
brands offer indistinguishable features? By appealing to emotion. In the words
of Marc GobS, author of Emotional Branding:
What is the difference between Ralph Lauren's new fragrance
Romance and Est6e Lauder's Pleasure? . . . between one cola and
another cola? ... a particular sneaker and its competitor? ... or many
different kinds of jeans, coffees, or gas stations? Or between one
beauty Web site and another? In this ocean of offerings, all fighting for
the same consumer dollar, the emotional connection is what makes
that all-important, essential difference. The emotional element is what
gives a brand both the foundation and fuel for future business
strategies--consumer-driven strategies.
197
When tangible features no longer distinguish products, "emotional
augmentation" must do the job.198 Emotional augmentation is what turns the
"fizzy sugar water" known as Coca-Cola into "the real thing."
1 99
products, and their eager fruition in the consumers' homes, have moved our society to a point where
practical considerations in the purchase of goods are often not given the central attention that was true
in the past.").
194. See DARYL TRAVIS, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: How SUCCESSFUL BRANDS GAIN THE
IRRATIONAL EDGE 3 (2000) ("I described to my client how today's marketplace is so crowded that
very few people have the time or the inclination to search through claims of product superiority. By
now, they've seen it all. Parity rules and acceptable performance is the price of entry."). Advertising is
the most important when objects are functionally interchangeable. JAMES B. TWITCHELL, LEAD US
INTO TEMPTATION: THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN MATERIALISM 92-93 (1999) ("[Advertising is
invoked when the objects are interchangeable. Such objects, called parity items, constitute most of the
commercial stuff that surrounds us, from toothpaste to beer to cars to airlines. What they have in
common is that they are all machine made. There is really no discernable difference between Colgate
and Crest, Miller and Budweiser, Ford and Chevrolet, Delta and United. In fact, the only difference is
usually in the advertising.").
195. See JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN
AMERICA 289 (1994) ("As technological developments were incorporated into the manufacturer's
merchandising plan, it became more and more difficult for him to differentiate his product from those
of his competitors. In 1890, soda crackers in sealed packages were a novelty; ten years later dozens of
such brands were available.").
196. Jonathan Knowles, The Role of Brands in Business, in BRANDS: VISIONS AND VALUES 21,
22 (John Goodchild & Clive Callow eds., 2001). Management expert Tom Peters is the author of the
1982 bestseller In Search of Excellence.
197. GOBS, supra note 193, at xxvi. It may be a sign of the times that two books entitled
Emotional Branding have been published since 2000. Id.; TRAVIS, supra note 194.
198. Knowles, supra note 196, at 21-23.
199. Id. Branding has been described as "the central activity creating differing values for such
commonplace objects and services as flour, bottled water, cigarettes, denim jeans, razor blades,
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The stories told through advertising, and the emotional connections made
with consumers, are an important part of "positioning" one's brand in the
marketplace. "Positioning" means creating a brand identity-a set of
associations that separates one brand from another, particularly when the
differences in the goods themselves are relatively minor. 2°° The clothing stores
Banana Republic, The Gap, and Old Navy, all owned by the same company, are
"positioned" to attract consumers of different ages, wealth, and aspirations.20 1
Although positioning a product so that it appeals to the targeted consumer is a
task with many dimensions-involving such things as store and product design,
packaging, and advertising-the selection of a brand name is an important
component. One author advises: "Choose a name or change to a name that
distinguishes you from the pack in the most favorable possible way. In an ad-
heavy, information-heavy environment, few choices you make will tell your
public so much or carry so much currency over time as your brand name."
2 2
A British corporation chose the name "Goldfish" for a new credit card, a
selection that might seem so unconnected to the goods as to be genuinely
arbitrary. In fact, it was a carefully considered step in "positioning" the product:
Why Goldfish? Because goldfish are the perfect symbol for the key
messages about the brand. Goldfish are domestic and the brand's
proposition is about saving on home essentials; everyone can own
goldfish and the brand is about inclusiveness; goldfish bring a splash of
colour to a financial world that's predominantly grey. Just as
important, their warm colour provides a visual link to the main benefit
- money off your gas bill - and a tonal link to the warmth of the home.
The surprising name reinforces the message that this card is designed
to change your ideas about credit cards: "You'll be surprised what you
can do with a Goldfish.
20 3
A mobile phone company chose the name "Orange" with similar thoughts.
Orange is "the colour of optimism and the rising sun, underlining an optimistic
domestic beers, batteries, cola drinks, air travel, overnight couriers, and telephone carriers." JAMES B.
TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA: THE TRIUMPH OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICAN CULTURE 13 (1996).
200. CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 80 (2004); see also
MARCONI, supra note 200, at 44 ("To position a product can mean to attempt to conjure an image or
an association in a mental frame of reference .... "). Advertisers also speak of developing a "Unique
Selling Proposition," often, in the words of James Twitchell, by staking out a distinct "emotional
territory" on the "map of other similar products." TWITCHELL, supra note 199, at 129.
201. Mercedes and BMW are both German producers of high-performance luxury cars, but even
they have "positioned" their products in slightly different ways to appeal to a slightly different
consumer.
BMW has taken physical performance and used it to communicate a form of emotional
aggression. BMW is for people who are on their way somewhere. A product for people who
live in life's metaphorical fast lane. BMW is a statement about how far and fast your career
is going. Mercedes has taken that powerful reliability and used it to communicate a form of
emotional reassurance. Mercedes offers comfort for people who have made it. A product for
people who are already at the top. Mercedes is a statement about achievement rewarded.
Knowles, supra note 196, at 45.
202. MARCONI, supra note 185, at 28.
203. Knowles, supra note 196, at 52.
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view of technology." 204 Oranges are simple, everyday items accessible to
everyone-as the telephone service is meant to be perceived. 2 5 One of the most
famous of recent brands is Amazon.com. Founder Jeff Bezos chose Amazon
over alternatives such as "cadabra," and his choice reaped the benefits of
positive associations: a suggestion of immense size combined with "so much
third-world, underdog, eco-conscious goodwill that every click on Amazon.com
feels like a vote for the rainforest. ' ' 20 6 Of course, these associations are most
important at the critical time when a new brand is launched. Eventually,
consumers will think less of rivers or rainforests when they encounter
Amazon.com and more of their experience with the company itself.
One could regard this use of associations as a kind of trick played on the
consumer. After all, the consumer who chooses Amazon.com because of some
sympathy for the rainforest receives no corresponding benefit. Jeff Bezos's
company really has nothing to do with the Amazon. Yet the once fashionable
conception of advertising as a tool for manipulating helpless consumers, for
playing on their fears and desires in ways they do not comprehend,20 7 seems to
have given way to the idea that consumers are, in fact, willing participants in the
game. Why do they play along? Perhaps because, as discussed in the next
section, the symbolic association of goods with other ideas adds a dimension to
consumption that would otherwise be missing.
B. The Meaning in Consumer Goods
In his 1959 article Symbols for Sale, Sidney J. Levy argued that goods are
"essentially psychological things ... symbolic of personal attributes and goals
and of social patterns and strivings." 20 8 Consumers, he said, "buy things not only
for what they can do, but also for what they mean."20 9 While some possessions-
diplomas, wedding rings, trophies-are overtly symbolic, even those with more
obvious functions may be valued for what they symbolize. A consumer buys a
Rolex watch as much for what it says, to himself and others, about his taste,
status and means, as for its ability to keep time. Acquiring meaningful goods
"demonstrate[s] that one is alive, that one matters, that one makes a difference
in the world. '210 The meaning found in possessions may even substitute, in the
204. Id. at 54.
205. Id.
206. TRAVIS, supra note 194, at 160 (quoting Peter de Jonge, Riding the Wild, Perilous Waters of
Amazon.com, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 36).
207. The best-known exposition of this point of view is VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN
PERSUADERS (1957).
208. Sidney J. Levy, Symbols for Sale, HARV. Bus. REV. July-Aug. 1959, at 117, 119; accord
GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION: NEW APPROACHES TO THE SYMBOLIC
CHARACTER OF CONSUMER GOODS AND AcrIvmEs 71 (1988) (noting ability of consumer goods to
carry and communicate cultural meaning apart from their commercial and utilitarian values).
209. Levy, supra note 208, at 118.
210. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS:
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 27 (1981).
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impersonal setting of the industrialized world, for the symbolic values once
supplied by social institutions.
211
Meaning is not inherent in physical objects. Meaning generally begins in the
culturally constituted world of abstract values and distinctions. Certain objects
acquire meaning-they come to embody, in physical form, some cultural ideal-
and they transfer that meaning, ultimately, to the consumers who purchase
them. 212 The object of a great deal of advertising is to imbue objects with the
kind of meaning that adds marketable value and distinguishes one product from
another. 213 Advertising does this by suggesting equivalence between the goods
and the abstract value the consumer desires214-between, for example, a Rolex
watch and enhanced social status. Purchase this watch, and you will have
prestige; drink this beer, and you will fit in; wear these clothes, and you will be
fashionable. If the advertising succeeds, convincing consumers that the
equivalence is real, the goods become meaningful and the sales pitch is, to a
degree, self-fulfilling. Consumers can be elevated, socially, by their possessions,
and sometimes they feel their lives enriched.
215
That is not to say goods always deliver the more satisfying life promised by
advertising. But even when the reality falls short of the ideal, goods still can
211. See KEVIN DRAWBAUGH, BRANDS IN THE BALANCE: MEETING THE CHALLENGES TO
COMMERCIAL IDENTITY 231 (2001) ("Traditional institutions take time, effort and stability to
maintain. Sadly these qualities are in short supply. As a result, in some lives, the bulwarks of non-
market-based culture are eroding. In their place, more people are seeking meaning in the ideas and
symbols that the market economy makes so very prominent and so effortlessly attainable -
commercial brands."); TWITCHELL, supra note 194, at 12 ("What sets American culture of the late
twentieth century apart is not avarice, but a surfeit of machine-made things. What is clear is that most
of these things in and of themselves simply do not mean enough. So we have developed very powerful
ways to add meaning to goods .... Consumption of things and their meanings is how most Western
young people cope in a world that science has pretty much bled of traditional religious meanings.").
212. See MCCRACKEN, supra note 208, at 71-72 ("Meaning is constantly flowing to and from its
several locations in the social world, aided by the collective and individual efforts of designers,
producers, advertisers, and consumers. There is a traditional trajectory to the movement of this
meaning. Usually it is drawn from a culturally constituted world and transferred to the consumer good.
It is then drawn from the object and transferred to the individual consumer.").
213. See id. at 79 ("Advertising is a kind of conduit through which meaning is constantly being
poured in its movement from the culturally constituted world to consumer goods."); TWITCHELL,
supra note 199 at 13 (describing advertising as one of several ways to give meaning to objects).
214. MCCRACKEN, supra note 208, at 77. Specifically, in the words of Grant McCracken:
Advertising works as a potential method of meaning transfer by bringing the consumer
good and a representation of the culturally constituted world together within the frame of a
particular advertisement. The creative director of an agency seeks to conjoin these two
elements in such a way that the viewer/reader glimpses an essential similarity between them.
When this symbolic equivalence is successfully established, the viewer/reader attributes
certain properties he or she knows to exist in the culturally constituted world to the
consumer good. The known properties of the world thus come to be resident in the unknown
properties of the consumer good. The transfer of meaning from world to good is
accomplished.
Id.
215. See TWITCHELL, supra note 199, at 4 (stating that advertising gives our lives value by
imbuing objects with value).
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serve as what anthropologist Grant McCracken calls "bridges to displaced
meaning." 216 In a disappointing world, he writes, individuals often cope by
imagining a better, more fulfilling existence in some distant time or place.
217
Advertising conjures up that better world and offers the product as a bridge: own
this, and you will be that much closer to the life you imagine. McCracken
explains:
[G]oods help the individual contemplate the possession of an
emotional condition, a social circumstance, even an entire style of life,
by somehow concretizing these things in themselves. They become a
bridge to displaced meaning and an idealized version of life as it should
be lived. When called to mind, these objects allow the individual to
rehearse a much larger set of possessions, attitudes, circumstances, and
opportunities. A simple example of this is the use of a "rose-covered
cottage." The individual reflects on the eventual possession of such a
cottage and in the process reflects upon the possession of an entire way
of life that specifies more or less explicitly a certain kind of livelihood,
spouse, domestic arrangement, and so on. The cottage becomes the
"objective correlative" of this diverse package of displaced meaning.218
The idea of seeking fulfillment through consumption can paint a rather
bleak and materialistic picture. McCracken writes of "pathologies" wherein
consumers rely too much on material goods to satisfy deeper needs.219 In its
proper place, however, a glimpse of a better life is something that consumers
enjoy, and consumers reward marketers who encourage their fantasies.
Advertising promises more than one version of the good life. As previously
discussed, 220 marketers position their brands to appeal to different notions of the
ideal. Advertising for one brand of breakfast cereal might conjure up something
close to the world of the "rose-covered cottage"; advertising for another brand,
perhaps aimed at teenagers, could paint a different picture. By generating a
symbolic depth and diversity sometimes lacking in the goods themselves,
advertising creates additional opportunities for self-expression.2 21 If one's
216. MCCRACKEN, supra note 208, at 109.
217. Id. at 110.
218. Id. It works, McCracken explains, because any disappointment following purchase does not
discredit the ideal:
What is being bought is not the whole bridge but a small part of it. Indeed the purchase has a
quality of rehearsal to it. It is consumption in training. The individual clearly understands
that he or she is not laying claim to the whole parcel of displaced meaning that has been
transported to another time and place, but merely a small, anticipatory part of it. This gives
another virtue for the concrete and discrete nature of the good. It can be broken off and
used to anticipate the larger purchase.
Id. at 112.
219. Id. at 88.
220. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
221. See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 210, at 93 (arguing that we now
define ourselves through consumption rather than production and that things "send messages about
who we are"); MCCRACKEN, supra note 208, at 88 ("One of the ways individuals satisfy the freedom
and responsibility of self-definition is through the systematic appropriation of the meaningful
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resources permit, one can choose to be the kind of person who buys a Volvo or
the kind of person who buys a Cadillac. The mythology of the brand, cultivated
through advertising, gives one's choice more significance in developing a sense of
self and more power to express one's values through consumption.
At the same time, associative marketing adds an element of fantasy to
shopping, purchasing, and owning that would be absent if advertisers confined
themselves to facts and figures. Some argue that the straightforward marketing
of goods and services is giving way to the "staging of experiences" 222-
experiences that begin with promoting the brand. Successful brands "go way
beyond the confines of their product dimensions. They create their own mind
space. They give you not just a physical product or service, but an experience
that engages your imagination. '" 223 Advertising that positions the product in a
rich symbolic context enhances the experience. Arguably, consumers desire the
emotional connection, or the symbolism, more than they desire the goods
themselves. According to James Twitchell, it is not the product we buy but "the
aura around it," and it may be the "sizzle," not the "steak," that satisfies our
needs.224 In short, marketing adds meaning to goods beyond their physical
attributes because the public craves meaning and is willing to pay for it.225
Consumers understand, at some level, that the fantasies promoted through
marketing must be taken with a grain of salt, but that does not eliminate the
satisfaction they find in the process.
226
properties of goods."); Knowles, supra note 196, at 42 (contending that consumers often choose one
brand over another due to intangible features relating to how product makes them feel); Levy, supra
note 193, at 56 (concluding that modem goods are primarily symbolic of personal attributes and social
status).
222. TRAVIS, supra note 194, at 86-87; see also ScHMrrr, supra note 182, at 22 ("Today,
customers take functional features and benefits, product quality, and a positive brand image as a given.
What they want is products, communications, and marketing campaigns that dazzle their senses, touch
their hearts, and stimulate their minds. They want products, communications, and campaigns that they
can relate to and that they can incorporate into their lifestyles. They want products, communications,
and marketing campaigns to deliver an experience.").
223. TRAVIS, supra note 194, at 78.
224. TWITCHELL, supra note 194, at 73. "We might consider that the customer often drinks the
advertising, not the beer; drives the name-plate, not the car; or smokes the advertising, not the
cigarette." Id at 73-74.
225. See Knowles, supra note 196, at 21 ("Brands' ability to communicate meaning is important
because, as humans, we like to perceive meaning in what we do. Brands allow us to imbue our actions
with a sense of added significance. Simple decisions - such as the jeans we wear or the beer we drink -
become opportunities for self-expression, for adding symbolic significance to an otherwise functional
decision.").
226. T.J. Jackson Lears has suggested that many consumers cannot help but get caught up in
these fantasies:
No doubt many ordinary [twentieth-century] Americans refused to embrace this world [of
advertising] literally, but they were drawn into it for its entertainment value-the sensual
appeal of its illustrations, the seductiveness of basking (however briefly) in the promise of
self-realization through consumption. Many advertisements took their place along side other
mass diversions-the amusement park, the slick-paper romance, the movies. None
demanded to be taken literally or even all that seriously; yet all promised intense "real life"
to their clientele, and all implicitly defined "real life" as something outside the individual's
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C. The Symbolic Value of Geography
Geographic associations are a powerful tool for marketers. Advertising the
place where a product was made "can provide interest, energy, and
differentiation to a target brand. '2 7 It conveys a sense of local pride and the
promise of a unique experience. When goods come from a region with a
reputation for quality, the benefits are obvious.228 Yet the symbolic value of
geography may be a more important factor in marketing than anything specific
one can deduce about the goods by knowing where they were made. 229 For
example, few consumers could say how linens made in Ireland differ from linens
made in Vietnam, even if local materials or production techniques did set them
apart. But one suspects that the feeling of tradition associated with Ireland,
which may have more to do with castles and meadows than with textile
manufacture, would make Irish linens more valuable to some consumers than
Vietnamese linens. Famous place names are charged with ready-made
associations, ripe for exploitation by marketers. They are a shortcut to the better
world of displaced meaning. By invoking the name of Ireland, a marketer can
immediately conjure up a host of images useful in "positioning" a product in the
symbolic landscape.
That is why famous geographic names, at least those with marketable
associations, are so tempting to borrow. For example, by naming its domestically
produced cookies after such old-world cities as Brussels, Milan, and Bordeaux,
Pepperidge Farm-an American brand evoking an image of old-fashioned rural
wholesomeness-acquires an extra dimension of symbolism. 230 Indeed, the
packaged food industry is particularly conscious of the benefits of association
with remote lands and cultures. As Marc Gob6 writes with reference to naming
and packaging:
everyday experience.
Lears, supra note 190, at 28.
227. DAVID A. AAKER, BRAND PORTFOLIO STRATEGY: CREATIVrrY, RELEVANCE,
DIFFERENTIATION, ENERGY, LEVERAGE, AND CLARITY 179 (2004).
228. Id at 179 (noting that associating a brand with a region that has the "heritage of making the
best within that product class" adds the benefit of "credibility"); SIDNEY J. LEVY, Marketing Stages in
Developing Nations (1991), reprinted in BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS, & RESEARCH 164, 169
(Dennis W. Rooked ed., 1999) ("There is the kind of general reputation for optical equipment
associated with Germany, perfume and wine from France, linen from Ireland, woolens from Scotland,
and so on, as shown in many studies of imagery and countries of origin."); Simon Anholt, Branding
Places and Nations, in BRANDS AND BRANDING, supra note 20, at 213, 215 tbl.14.1 ("A powerful,
distinctive, broad-based and appealing national brand is the most valuable gift which a country or
region can give to its exporters: think what 'Made in Japan' does for electronics, or 'Made in Italy' for
fashion."). In marketers' lingo, some regions are said to "own" a product category. See Knowles, supra
note 196, at 46-47 ("Japan owns consumer electronics, Germany owns engineering prowess, France
owns fashion and luxury goods, Spain and Italy own passion, and the US owns information technology,
entertainment and mass consumerism.").
229. AAKER, supra note 227, at 179.
230. See GOBt, supra note 193, at 212 (suggesting that the names of Pepperidge Farm cookies
lead consumers to view them as "international delicacies, inciting our imaginations and taste buds").
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Some products gain enormous credibility if they are associated with
a specific culture. Russian vodka is still the authentic one, and we
would have a hard time buying Irish pasta-even if it were the best in
the world! Hershey's Ronzoni pasta brand communicates with its
graphics and packaging the authenticity of an Italian product. The old-
world typography and decor pictured is clearly European, and the
name Ronzoni places the brand in the geographic area of the known
specialists. Hdagen-Dazs has a Scandinavian name even though it is
made in New Jersey. Godiva, owned by Campbell's Soup, still trades
on its original European aspirational image with stores and packaging
styles that reflect the elitist nature of European gourmet foods. Most
mustard preparations reflect a French heritage.
231
Note Gob6's use of "credibility" and "authenticity" in this passage. In a
literal sense, the products seeking those qualities have no claim to authenticity if
they are not produced in the place their marketing evokes. Yet Gob6 does not
find the practice deceptive or manipulative:
I doubt that anybody is really duped by these marketing efforts. Instead
we are enticed by and want to participate in these aspirational stories
which are more fun than a generic, utilitarian product experience
because they help us to dream. Most people are quite willing to let
Ronzoni pasta be "Italian" in their minds!
232
In other words, evoking a sense of place adds value to the product, even if the
link is only imaginative. It feels more authentic.
Many of the geographic trademarks challenged as deceptive or deceptively
misdescriptive are chosen, at least in part, in order to borrow a sense of style
associated with a fashionable place.233 For example, the name "Hotel Monaco,"
adopted by a California corporation and challenged in In re Kimpton Hotel &
Restaurant Group, Inc.,234 alluded to the principality of Monaco, a place known
for its luxurious hotels and casinos. The San Francisco hotel underscored the
implied European connection with architecture, paintings, furnishings, and
accessories in the French or European style.235 The brochure promised to
transport guests, in their imaginations, to a better place:
With its French-inspired architecture and sensually rich decor, the
newly restored Hotel Monaco is very clear in its intentions. The idea is
to seduce and pamper-to surround guests with a sense of escape to far
away places, and to do it in the style to which the savviest of travelers
have become accustomed.
236
231. Id. at 216.
232. Id.
233. Referring to the use of famous artworks in advertising, James Twitchell refers to "value by
association, what in advertising is called borrowed interest"-a suggestion that juxtaposition alone
accomplishes transfer of meaning. TWITCHELL, supra note 199, at 43; see also id. at 186 ("When you
want to borrow value for an object, you insert it near objects already certified as valuable. Value
leaks.").
234. 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154 (T.T.A.B. 2000).
235. Kimpton Hotel & Rest., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
236. Id. at 1156 n.2.
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Nevertheless, the TFAB found sufficient evidence that guests would take the
name "Monaco" literally and believe that the hotel had more than metaphorical
connections to the principality.
237
In In re Fashion Group,238 an Italian clothing manufacturer adopted the
name "NoLIta," a reference to a fashionable shopping district (North of Little
Italy) in New York City.239 The manufacturer argued that it did not intend to
conceal the Italian origins of its goods.240 Italy has a strong reputation for stylish
clothing. Nevertheless, the PTO rejected the application for a "NoLIta"
trademark, finding both a sufficient goods/place association to mislead
consumers as to the origin of the clothing, 241 and the element of materiality
necessary to satisfy the In re California Innovations
242 standard of deception.243
On the other hand, in In re Jacques Bernier,244 the Federal Circuit reversed
the TTAB's rejection of "Rodeo Drive" as a mark for perfume that was neither
manufactured nor sold on Beverly Hills' fashionable street. 241 In this case, the
court found no evidence that any consumer would take Rodeo Drive as a literal
indication of origin.246 The cases may be distinguishable. Consumers may take
NoLIta for clothing more literally than they would take Rodeo Drive for
perfume. But in each case the manufacturer's intent was probably the same: to
position its product with certain stylish associations. Other trademarks evoking
places better known for vacation travel than for manufacturing-for example,
Nantucket 247 and Sea Island248-fall in the same category.
237. Id. at 1158.
238. 2004 TTAB LEXIS 688 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2004) (nonprecedential opinion).
239. In re Fashion Group, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 688, at *4-6.
The evidence submitted by the examining attorney shows that the neighborhood known
as "NoLIta" is associated with various things: narrow streets and smaller buildings than in
nearby neighborhoods, which mean less vehicle traffic; easy pedestrian access to boutiques
and specialized shops and cafes; and that the boutiques and shops may market clothing,
shoes, jewelry, handbags, cosmetics, or housewares.
Id. at *23-24.
240. Id. at *7 n.4.
241. Id. at *24.
The record in this case establishes much more than a tenuous connection between
"NoLIta" and clothing items. Instead, the record establishes that clothing designers are
concentrated in the neighborhood and that it is known for its trend-setting and unique
clothing boutiques. Some of the evidence speaks directly to consumers' recognition that
"NoLIta" is noted for its fashionable clothing.
Id. at *27.
242. 329 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
243. In re Fashion Group, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 688, at *29-30; see also In re Cal. Innovations, Inc.,
329 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that a deceptively misdescriptive mark must materially
impact consumers' decision to buy goods).
244. 894 F.2d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
245. In re Jacques Bernier, 894 F.2d at 390-91.
246. Id. at 391.
247. In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nantucket shirts); In re Nantucket
Allserve, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1145 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (Nantucket Nectars).
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If it is true that traditional "features and benefits" marketing is giving way
to more emotional appeals, one could expect a trend away from the use of place
names in a literal sense and toward their use to evoke a range of feelings and
associations. Moreover, as businesses become more complex and geographically
dispersed, the place of origin for goods, in any literal sense, becomes more
elusive. A soft drink might be bottled in America, under the authority of a
company headquartered in Britain, using ingredients supplied from Canada and
a recipe developed in France. Would it be descriptive or misdescriptive to
describe that product as American, British, Canadian, or French?
249
Some geographic names already stand as much for an idea as for a place.
"Hollywood" means the motion picture industry;250 "Cooperstown" means the
Baseball Hall of Fame.251 Perhaps, in time, consumers will come to interpret all
geographic allusions less literally. Perhaps they will interpret "Monaco" more
often as a symbol or a theme than as a literal place of origin that might suggest
something distinctive about the goods. This treatment is, at least, a possibility,
and one that current trademark law, in its literal-mindedness, may be ill
equipped to address. In Part IV, I consider how geographic trademarks
interpreted symbolically might be treated under current law and whether
anything further should be done to restrict such uses.
248. Sea Island Co. v. Kroehler Corp., 2005 TTAB LEXIS 158, at *49 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2005)
(nonprecedential opinion). In Sea Island, a furniture manufacturer named its collections after various
picturesque localities, including Savannah, Santa Fe, and Carmel. Id. at *25. The American Signature
Sea Island Collection, named after an exclusive resort community, was "[i]ntended to evoke a casual,
carefree style of living." Id. at *26. Curiously, the party opposing registration of the trademark
challenged "American" rather than "Sea Island" as the geographically misdescriptive term. Id. at *48-
49.
249. Courts have already faced the difficulty of pinning services to a specific geographic location.
In In re Les Halles, 334 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Federal Circuit extended the In re California
Innovations standard of materiality for a geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark to services-
in this case, kosher restaurants named "Le Marais" after the Jewish quarter of Paris. In re Les Halles,
334 F.3d at 1374-75. Clearly, patrons of the New York Le Marais restaurant would know they had not
been transported to France. They might believe, however, that "the food served by the restaurant was
imported from Paris, or that the chefs in New York received specialized training in the region in Paris,
or that the New York menu is identical to a known Parisian menu," or that some other literal
connection with Paris explained the Parisian name. Id. at 1374. Any mistake of this kind, if caused by
the name "Le Marais," might render the trademark deceptive. Similarly, in In re Consolidated
Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (T.T.A.B. 2004), the TTAB rejected the name
"Colorado Steakhouse" for restaurants located in Indiana and Illinois and serving steaks from places
other than Colorado. The applicant argued that the name "Colorado" accurately described the origin
of the style or atmosphere offered by the ski-lodge-themed restaurants. In re Consolidated Specialty
Rests., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925. The TTAB found consumers might take "Colorado" to be a
literal reference to the source of the meat served at the restaurants, a conclusion reinforced by
evidence that Colorado is known for the quality of its beef. Id. at 1927-28. Whether consumers would
or would not take the geographic reference as literally as the TTAB supposed, the difficulty is plain:
The services supplied by a restaurant may have many origins. The same is increasingly true of
products.
250. In re Int'l Taste, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604, 1605 (T.T.A.B. 2000).
251. In re Mun. Capital Mkts. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1371 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
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IV. REGULATING THE USE OF GEOGRAPHICALLY EVOCATIVE TRADEMARKS
If a court were to consider the registrability of the name "Tucson" as a
trademark for Hyundai's SUV, it would attempt to place the mark on the
spectrum of distinctiveness discussed in Part 11.252 "Tucson" is not generic for
automobiles, nor is it fanciful in the sense that it was coined by Hyundai for use
as a mark. It might be categorized as arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, or
misdescriptive. Assuming that the product has no literal connection with Arizona
eliminates descriptive. Under the standard of In re California Innovations,
Inc.,253 the mark could be considered misdescriptive if consumers would believe
that the product came from Tucson (because of a known association between
Tucson and automobiles) but could be denied as deceptively misdescriptive only
if consumers were moved by their misconception to purchase the vehicle.254 Let
us assume, for purposes of argument, that Arizona is not associated with
automobile manufacturing. The mark could not be classified as arbitrary on
grounds of obscurity; for most consumers, the name "Tucson" should have
geographic significance.
By the process of elimination, a court would likely categorize the mark as
arbitrary or suggestive. The name "Tucson" is not "connected with the goods" in
any literal sense, but it is not arbitrary in the same way that "Alaska bananas" is
arbitrary.255 The name is not meaningless. It conjures up a host of associations,
based on all of the impressions and memories that would come to mind, or stir in
the subconscious, of consumers who have heard of Tucson, Arizona. Indeed,
those associations might influence consumers to choose the vehicle, even if they
know perfectly well that the Tucson SUV was made somewhere else. Agencies
would not be paid large sums to devise brand names if manufacturers did not
believe that the names made a difference, and one can be sure that Hyundai
would not have considered "Cleveland" or "Milwaukee" equally suitable.
"Suggestive" might seem the most fitting category, but putting "Tucson" there
would group it with marks that are descriptive by indirection-like "Downy,"
which suggests the softness of clothes treated with fabric softener. It would be
difficult to say what specific characteristics "Tucson" suggests about the SUV.
Although there is little doubt of the outcome-"Tucson" would almost certainly
be granted registration-the analysis would suffer from the absence of a well-
defined characterization of the trademark.
252. See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
253. 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.




Names like "Tucson" may demand a new category on the spectrum of
distinctiveness-a category I will call "evocative" marks.256 An evocative mark
might be defined as one that spurs meaningful associations without suggesting
anything definite about the nature of the product.257 Trademarks may be
evocative without being geographical-the name "Lincoln," for example, evokes
historical associations-but geographic names, because of their symbolic
potency, would account for many evocative marks. How should such marks be
treated? They would seem to fit most comfortably between arbitrary and
suggestive marks. They are not as meaningless as arbitrary marks are assumed to
be, but their exclusive appropriation is even less threatening to competition than
the exclusive appropriation of suggestive marks. If no competitive need prevents
"Downy" from being reserved as a trademark because competitors can still
describe softness in literal terms or through other allusions, 258 it would appear
that evocative marks, even less definite in their message, would be fair game.
Hence, one would expect an evocative mark, as I have described it, to be allowed
trademark status without evidence of secondary meaning, whether or not a court
or the Trademark Office troubled to draw the distinctions made here.
If the thought processes of consumers followed the logical progression often
suggested by the courts,259 one could dismiss evocative trademarks as
meaningless. Imagine a consumer, shopping for an SUV, who first encountered
the Hyundai Tucson. Let us assume that he is familiar with the city of Tucson,
Arizona. He would ask himself whether the mark is to be taken literally-in
other words, was the vehicle manufactured, or possibly designed, in Tucson? He
would search his memory for recollections of an automobile industry in Arizona.
If nothing came to mind, he would conclude, correctly, that the SUV was not
connected with Tucson. At that point, the name "Tucson" would play no further
part in his decision making, even if he had positive thoughts about the city. It is
unlikely, however, that this scenario fully accounts for the ways consumers
process the messages conveyed through trademarks.
Let us imagine a more plausible consumer. This consumer, a Michigan
resident, also desires an SUV. Perhaps it is the "rose-covered cottage" of her
imagined better life. She pictures herself enjoying more travel and impressing
her acquaintances with a concrete expression of a freer and more affluent
lifestyle. Flipping through a magazine, she encounters an advertisement for the
Hyundai Tucson. She has heard of Tucson, Arizona. If she were asked what
Tucson brought to mind, she would mention that it was warm, open, out West
256. "Fictitious" could be an alternative characterization. See supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
257. Arguably, any "arbitrary" mark drawn from an existing vocabulary-even "Alaska
bananas"-brings with it a set of associations, regardless of the product with which it is connected. If
this is the case, it might be best simply to rename the "arbitrary" category to reflect this and cease
pretending that anything other than a coined trademark could be truly arbitrary.
258. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
259. See supra Part II.B.
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where she would like to travel, and a prosperous, fashionable place to be. But no
one asks her that question as she reads the advertisement, so those associations
hardly rise to the level of conscious thought. Nor does she ask herself where the
vehicle is made. She may know that Hyundai is a Korean company, but
automobile manufacturing is so internationalized that speculation about
geographic origin, or what it might mean to the quality of the vehicle, is not what
occupies her thoughts. Instead, she is imagining herself owning the vehicle, and
the name "Tucson," together with other messages delivered by the
advertisement-text promising a generous warranty and a photograph of the
vehicle speeding down a desert highway-help her to imagine owning the vehicle
as the fulfillment of her dream. The name "Tucson" contributes to this
emotional appeal.
Yet even if there is more to evocative trademarks than the traditional
analysis allows, they can still be considered harmless. The promises made by an
evocative trademark are too vague to be the cause of much disappointment.
Indeed, they are so vague that it would be difficult to categorize the emotional
message of "Tucson" as true or false. Probably few Tucson owners would be
surprised to learn that the trademark is only a name, even if pointing that out
might cause them to consider whether they had been manipulated. Most Tucson
owners probably never give it a second thought. At the same time, no Hyundai
competitors would have reason to complain that exclusive use of the term
"Tucson" had denied them any significant opportunity.
Hence, the dominant themes of the trademark laws-protecting consumers
from confusion and ensuring a competitive marketplace-are entirely consistent
with permitting exclusive rights to evocative trademarks like "Tucson." In fact, if
consumers seek emotional fulfillment in the things they buy, evocative
trademarks actually add value to products through the addition of positive
associations. The Tucson delivers more satisfaction, perhaps, than it would if it
were named the "Hyundai Model 3." Why discourage a bit of constructive
fantasy that harms no one? But there is a reason to hesitate. No one can claim a
personal interest in the idea of "downiness," unless it is other fabric softener
manufactures who, if "Downy" were a trademark, might be limited in their
freedom to describe their own products. Tucson is another matter. People live
there and take pride in their community. Businesses operate there and benefit
from positive feelings about Tucson. They might resent other businesses
encroaching on their "territory," even if the invasion is purely symbolic.
B. Restrictions Modeled on the Right of Publicity
An individual whose identity has been exploited for commercial gain may
bring an action to defend his "right of publicity," 26° a right that might provide a
model for limiting the symbolic use of geographic terms. Originally grounded in
260. In the introduction to his treatise of the rights of publicity and privacy, Professor McCarthy
describes the former, though now in its fourth decade, as "still a relatively raw and brash newcomer." 1
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, at v (2d ed. 2000).
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the common law right of privacy, 261 the right of publicity is now protected by
statute in a number of states. 262 The right of publicity allows a famous person to
object to, among other things, the unauthorized use of his name as a
trademark.2 63 In some cases, preventing the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
name serves the traditional trademark objective of protecting consumers from
deception. For example, allowing a sporting goods manufacturer, without Tiger
Woods's permission, to sell a line of "Tiger Woods" golf clubs might create the
false impression that the product had been endorsed by the famous athlete.
There are other mechanisms, however, such as an action under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, for dealing with such confusion.264 The right of publicity may
be violated even where there is no false impression to remedy, perhaps because
the otherwise misleading use of the famous name has been counteracted with
prominent notices denying the celebrity's sponsorship or approval.
265
In such cases, the rationale for barring the unauthorized use is more difficult
to articulate. The best theories focus either on a visceral feeling of unfairness
associated with the commercial exploitation of someone else's hard-won fame,
266
or the concern that unauthorized exploitation will deny the celebrity an
important source of compensation, thereby undermining the financial incentive
to become famous.267 Neither theory is unassailable. The first depends on an
emotional reaction that some do not share. When celebrities benefit, financially
261. William Prosser identified the right of publicity as one of the four distinct causes of action
hitherto grouped under the general common law heading of privacy. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383,401-07 (1960) (describing common law rights against invasion of privacy and against
appropriation of identity).
262. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997) (stating that one who uses another's "name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness" on goods for "advertising or selling," without consent, is
liable for resulting damages).
263. The right of publicity may also prohibit the use of other identifying characteristics, such as
an individual's voice or likeness, to promote a product. California Civil Code section 3344(a), for
example, encompasses the unauthorized use of an individual's "name, voice, signature, photograph or
likeness." Id.
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (establishing civil liability of those who use confusing or
deceptive marks conveying a "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact").
265. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CAL. L. REV. 125,231 (1993).
266. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 260, § 2.2 (describing right of publicity as "self-evident natural
right" grounded on "visceral impulses of 'fairness'). But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th Cir. 1996) (discounting McCarthy's analysis as a "blind
appeal[] to first principles [that] carr[ies] no weight in our balancing analysis").
267. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 260, § 2.6. In contrast to other causes of action relating to
"privacy," the right of publicity has little to do with avoiding embarrassment. Usually those who sue to
defend their right of publicity are pleased by public exposure; they simply wish to be paid for it. See
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) ("[I]t is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.").
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and otherwise, through their constant exposure to the public eye, it is perhaps
not unfair to treat their identities as a part of the cultural commons, so long as
consumers are in no way deceived. The second theory suffers from practical
limitations. Some people become famous without effort, or through acts that
society would not wish to encourage.268 Even celebrities who deserve some
reward often receive more than enough compensation through other sources.
Sports figures and movie stars, for example, are so highly paid for their services
that the additional revenue achieved by enforcing the right of publicity could not
be expected to alter their behavior.2 69 Yet, in spite of these objections, the right
of publicity, for famous individuals, is now firmly established as an independent
branch of intellectual property law.
A parallel "geographic right of publicity" might be devised, barring the
unauthorized exploitation for commercial gain of the name of a famous place,
even if no consumer would be misled into believing that the product had been
produced there. This would make trademarks like "Hyundai Tucson" or
"Nantucket shirts," clearly meant to exploit the positive images of famous places,
subject to attack.2 70 Those who regard as self-evident the exclusive right of an
individual to market his own identity, or who bridle at the injustice of profiting
from another's fame, might conclude that geographic restrictions are equally
justified. Why should Hyundai profit from goodwill that it did not earn? In this
case, however, the issue of fairness is more elusive. If a region owed its positive
aura entirely to the labor of its inhabitants, it might seem unjust for outsiders to
appropriate that value. If Monaco, for example, had positive associations for
travelers because of the efforts of local businesses to pamper tourists, perhaps no
San Francisco hotel would be justified in exploiting Monaco's goodwill, even
through a strictly imaginative association. But many locations have symbolic
value because of attractive scenery, historical associations, literary connections,
or other phenomenon from which the residents benefit, but for which they
cannot claim credit.
Moreover, even the benefits of an earned reputation are enjoyed by some
local residents who did nothing to contribute. A newly opened boutique on
Beverly Hills' Rodeo Drive would benefit from the neighborhood's reputation
for stylishness. Such local businesses are no less "free riders" than businesses
that appropriate a place name without locating their business there.
Consequently, the unequal treatment of residents and outsiders, equally
undeserving of the benefits of regional goodwill, might in the end seem more
unfair than the current situation. One answer might be to require any business to
268. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1965) (dismissing
action brought by administratrix of Al Capone's estate, alleging misappropriation of his name,
likeness, and personality, since appellants were not "named or referred to" in broadcasts in question
and since broadcasts occurred more than one decade after death of Capone).
269. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974 ("[T]he inducements generated by publicity rights are not
nearly as important as those created by copyright and patent law.").
270. An immediate difficulty would be identifying the appropriate plaintiff. For practical reasons,
local governments, which could best represent the interests of the entire community, seem best suited
to assert rights associated with a place, rather than an individual.
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pay a license fee to the community (e.g., the city of Tucson) to secure the right to
use the name. Then residents and outsiders would be treated equally, and all
could claim some contribution to the community through, if nothing else, their
license fee. One could expect considerable resistance from local businesses,
however, and the "fairness" of requiring such a fee is less than obvious, even if it
could be worthwhile as a source of revenue.
The economic incentives rationale, often problematic in the case of an
individual's right of publicity, would be at least as dubious here. It presupposes
that the fame and good reputation of places turns on the investments of
residents, rather than accidental factors, such as the natural setting, over which
they have no control. Even if local investments did matter, it would be difficult
to devise any scheme that would return the value of those investments, as
reflected in the positive image of the region, to the particular individuals who
had earned it. Finally, one can just imagine that a person like Tiger Woods
would see his dreams of fortune significantly reduced if businesses could use his
name to attract attention without paying him for the privilege. But it is most
unlikely that denying Tucson, or any other place, the revenue that might be
generated through a community-based right of publicity would cause the
inhabitants to scale back their efforts and investments and languish in
comparative obscurity. Thus, while it is not too far-fetched to contemplate a
geographic right of publicity-in the field of intellectual property, new rights are
frequently discovered-the rationale for such a right would be debatable.
C. Restrictions Modeled on Trademark Dilution
An alternative approach to limiting the symbolic use of geography could
rely on the concept of "dilution," a comparatively recent addition to the lexicon
of trademark law. 271 Whether similar trademarks pose a likelihood of confusion
often depends on whether the products on which they appear are similar or
different.272 Consumers might conclude, incorrectly, that Lipton Coffee is made
by the producers of Lipton Tea because the products are similar enough to infer
a connection. But even if there is no confusion, a famous trademark may be
diluted by its use on a product of a different kind-Buick Aspirin or Kodak
Pianos.273 One kind of dilution is tarnishment by the association of the famous
trademark with goods that are inferior or distasteful.274 Another form of dilution
is blurring-the loss of distinctiveness, an impact said to occur when a trademark
271. The addition of section 43(c) to the Lanham Act established a federal remedy for the
dilution of famous trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
272. Courts consider a number of factors in determining whether there is a likelihood of
confusion, one of those factors being the similarity of the products. E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1961) (referring to the "proximity of the products").
273. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting that House
Judiciary Intellectual Property Subcommittee reports provided Buick Aspirin and Kodak Pianos "[als
examples of dilution").
274. Id. at 431-32.
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is overused, even on dissimilar goods.275 If "Tiffany," for example, were used on
all manner of products unrelated to the jewelry store, the uniqueness of the
name and its prestige would be gradually reduced, even if in no particular
instance would consumers believe that the latecomers were associated with the
original.
276
If the theory that protects trademarks like "Tiffany" from overexposure is
correct, a similar destructive effect could be predicted from the indiscriminate
use of famous geographic names. As commercial interests adopt the names of
famous places in order to borrow their positive associations, those associations
may gradually erode. A name like "Yosemite," for example, which immediately
conjures up images of spectacular natural scenes, might do so less readily if we
routinely encountered Yosemite motorcycles, Yosemite cereal, Yosemite jeans,
and Yosemite soap. The meaning of "Yosemite" would be changed and its
emotional appeal subverted.
Restrictions on the use of famous individuals' identities can be defended as
proof against a "tragedy of the celebrity commons," wherein a celebrity's fame is
exploited so often that, through overexposure, it ceases to have any value.
277
Michael Madow questioned the premise that sheer repetition devalues celebrity;
a Madonna T-shirt, he argued, might be worth more precisely "because
'everybody's got one."' 278 In the context of geographic references, the argument
may be stronger. The places that resonate with consumers may do so because
they are perceived as unspoiled or exclusive. The unlimited commercialization of
those places (or, at any rate, of the names of those places) may detract from the
very associations responsible for their emotional appeal. Madow also questioned
whether celebrity should be treated as an exhaustible resource. If the value of
one celebrity's identity was bled dry, advertisers could always resort to a "fresh
face." 279 But the atlas of culturally or emotionally significant places may not be
as limitless as the Who's Who of individual celebrity, and even if it were, the idea
of spoiling one place before moving on to another is no more attractive in a
symbolic than in a physical environment.
The injury would not be confined to those who actually live or do business
in the affected places. In a sense, the injury would be to anyone for whom the
place once held a different meaning. In The Culture of Consumption, T.J.
Jackson Lears describes how the efforts of advertisers to manipulate emotions
lead them "to a nether realm between truth and falsehood. '280 They promise
275. See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004) (defining dilution by
blurring as "'the gradual diminution or whittling away of the value of the famous mark by blurring
uses by others"' (quoting 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:94)).
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (providing that in action for dilution, owner of famous mark need
not prove likelihood of confusion).
277. Madow, supra note 265, at 220-21.
278. Id. at 222.
279. See id. at 224 (noting that "[b]ecause celebrity is a societal creation," when one celebrity's
status is no longer exploitable, there will always be newly created celebrities to exploit (quoting Tim
Frazer, Appropriation of Personality-A New Tort?, 99 LAW Q. REv. 281, 303 (1983))).
280. Lears, supra note 190, at 21.
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consumers "relief from feelings of unreality" but exacerbate such feelings "by
hastening what the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre has called 'the decline of
the referentials'-the tendency, under corporate capitalism, for words to become
severed from any meaningful referent. ' 281 Lears discusses the depreciation of
overused words such as "revolutionary" and "personality. 2 82 Similarly, when
companies selling goods that lack prestige try to gain it by appropriating the
name of a culturally significant locale, the name of a special place ends up
referring to not-so-special goods. Thus, the landscape of advertising can
"acquire[] an Alice-in-Wonderland quality, '283 in which the least exclusive
products may bear the most exclusive names, and the efforts of advertisers to
"help us dream" (about their products) may undermine our dreams in the end.
284
These effects might be slowed either by prohibiting the registration of
geographic names as trademarks except when they are literally descriptive, or,
more directly, by requiring the approval of some licensing authority before they
could be exploited commercially. This would, however, prompt a number of
objections. First, it would raise geographic names above other culturally
significant references that might suffer in similar ways through associative
advertising. When Ford adopted "Mustang" as its trademark, or General Motors
"Saturn," those terms lost some of their original significance. On the other hand,
perhaps geographic allusions are particularly meaningful and their appropriation
particularly damaging-something that the special treatment traditionally given
to geographic terms used as trademarks would support. The more fundamental
problem is the likely futility of attempting to control, though trademark laws, the
complex processes through which meaning is created.
Although it is often the case that marketers appropriate meaning from
culture and turn it to commercial uses, it would be oversimplifying to view the
movement as unidirectional. Like it or not, marketing is a part of culture itself,
and the stories it tells are some of the most ubiquitous, indeed unavoidable,
ingredients of our intellectual and emotional environment.2 85 Marketing takes
from culture, but contributes to it as well. A famous example is the modern
image of Santa Claus, shaped through images developed by the Coca-Cola
Company in advertising designed to associate soda consumption with the cold
winter months.2 86 Part of the meaning one attempted to protect from the
cheapening effects of advertising might owe its very existence to advertising.
Some places hold meaning for individuals because of what they, as
individuals, have experienced there. The attachment felt to one's hometown may
fall in that category. But it is safe to say that the most widely held meanings are
the products of culture. People who have never been to Las Vegas, Beverly Hills,
or Cape Cod have strong impressions of those places because of the stories they
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. (referring to general tendency in advertising for words to lose their meaning).
284. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
285. TWITCHELL, supra note 199, at 2-3, 16-18.
286. Id. at 175.
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have heard, and the images they have been presented, over the course of their
lives. These stories and images determine what these places symbolize. Travel
writer Paul Theroux described the literary baggage that could distort visitors'
perceptions of places in Britain.287 Even for people who had not read R.D.
Blackmore's Lorna Doone, the novel invested the place where it was set with a
special significance. 28 8 Perhaps some places have meaning because marketing has
created or reinforced it. Perhaps selling a Tucson SUV and implying that
"Tucson" is a name to be reckoned with actually generates prestige for the city.
Proving otherwise would be impossible.
289
V. CONCLUSION
Trademark law in the United States has too much ignored the powerful
symbolic uses of geography in marketing goods and services. Its focus on the
informational use of geographic terms, whether to instruct or to mislead,
overlooks what may be the most compelling reason to evoke geography in
choosing a trademark-the opportunity to enhance the allure of the product by
associating it, loosely and nondescriptively, with a meaningful place. Marketers
have long been aware of the selling power of fantasy, and, as functional
differences between products become less significant,290 increasingly the role of
geographic references in trademarks will be to position the product not in the
physical landscape of geographic origins but in the symbolic landscape of
imagination.
When the symbolism of place is appreciated as a valuable marketing tool,
one has to ask whether it should be available to anyone or whether the right to
evoke geographic associations should be limited to those whose products
actually come from those places. One could justify restrictions on the symbolic
use of geographic names by economic arguments focusing on "free rider"
externalities or on the corrosive effects of overexposure. Moral arguments have
a place as well. Without a doubt, marketers have exploited and subverted the
cultural significance of geography for their own profit-motivated reasons. A
"geographic right of publicity" or protections against "geographic symbolic
dilution" would appeal to many.
287. See PAUL THEROUX, KINGDOM BY THE SEA 343 (1983) ("[Alliens usually missed the point
about England by investing its landscape with the passions of its great literature, and it had so seldom
been seen plainly, without literary footnotes.").
288. See id. at 128 ("No one here had read Lorna Doone, but that didn't matter, because the
district had already been hallowed by it, and now it was seen in a kind of blurred and respectful way.
How could you possibly disparage a place that had inspired a famous novel?").
289. The same argument might be made with respect to famous trademarks. Perhaps borrowing
those marks for use on vastly different products works as an homage to the original. Consumers might
actually think better of Kodak cameras if a piano manufacturer paid tribute by adopting the same
name. Yet, dilution laws assume a contrary effect. See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the possibility of marks becoming diluted when they are indiscriminately used to
represent a wide variety of products.
290. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
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Yet, I am inclined to agree with Michael Madow, who wrote that "property
rights in our culture's basic linguistic, symbolic, and discursive raw materials
should not be created unless a clear and convincing showing is made that very
substantial social interests will thereby be served. ' 291 The shared meaning of
geography is one of those cultural "raw materials." However well-intentioned,
attempts to preserve meaning by restricting cultural discourse, even commercial
discourse, are a dangerous undertaking.
Meanings inevitably evolve. As businesses evoke and recode geography-
enhancing, embroidering, reinforcing, or redirecting meaning-perhaps they are
not exploiting culture but extending it. Perhaps they even improve our lives by
adding a dream-like significance to our possessions. One can easily exaggerate,
or overromanticize, in attacking such practices or in defending them. In the end,
it is difficult to say whether life is cheapened or enriched by this kind of
metaphorical discourse in the commercial sphere. Hence, while it is important
that the law acknowledge the symbolic dimension of geography more candidly
than it has, it is doubtful that restrictions on geographically evocative trademarks
would produce the clear benefit we seek.
291. Madow, supra note 263, at 239.
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